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Federal Transfer: Problems of Multiple Litigation and the
Inapplicability of Stare Decisis
I. INTRODUCTION
With a view toward ameliorating the harshness of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, Congress, in 1948, provided for transfer of cases
from one district to another on grounds similar to those underlying forum
non conveniens.' The statute (Section 1404 (a)) provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.'
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert4 the Supreme Court enumerated the criteria
to be used in ruling on a motion for dismissal under forum non conveniens
stating that in determining whether dismissal was to be granted, a court
should consider the private interests of the litigant, relative ease of access
to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses,
possibility of viewing the premises, relative advantages and obstacles to a
fair trial, and all other practical problems that make the trial of a case
easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.' Gilbert also emphasized that the weight
of convenience must be "strongly in favor of the defendant'" or the
motion for dismissal must be denied, thereby indicating that the defendant
could not obtain dismissal by a mere balancing of the convenience in his
favor.' A literal interpretation and strict application of the Gilbert rule
to 1404 (a) would point to the conclusion that the transfer provision is
'This doctrine states "the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jur-
isdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere."
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COL. L. REV. 1 (1929).
2 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 668 (1965).
'Change of Venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
4330 U.S. 501 (1947); Annot., 170 A.L.R. 319.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ginsburg, 125 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Pa. 1954), appeal dismissed, 228
F.2d 881 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 979 (1956), rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 813 (1956);
Lesser v. Chevalier, 138 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Latimer v. S/A Industries Reunidas F.
Matarazzo, 91 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Richer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 80 F. Supp.
971 (E.D. Mo. 1948); Cox v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Di Lella v.
Lehigh Val. R.R., 7 F.R.D. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
°Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).7 Perry v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 82 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
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little more than a codification of the old forum non conveniens rule8 and
that the courts have very little discretion in granting transfer. Some courts
have stated that in granting transfer a district judge is limited in his
consideration to the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the
interest of justice,' while others have endowed district judges with broad
discretion in determining transfer." Still other courts have taken the
seemingly irreconcilable viewpoint that although a district judge has
broad discretion in determining transfer, he is limited in his consideration
to factors specifically mentioned in 1404 (a) and may not properly be
governed in his decision by any other factor or consideration.1" However,
in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick" the Supreme Court, using language in con-
trast to that in Gilbert, stated that the statute was not a codification of
the forum non conveniens rule and that under 1404 (a) courts have broad
discretion in granting transfer. 3 The Court quoted All States Freight v.
Modarelli" in which it was said:
[T]he doctrine of "forum non conveniens" involves dismissal of a case
because the forum chosen by the plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and
inconvenient that it is better to stop the litigation in the place where it was
brought and let it start all over again somewhere else; and such a doctrine is
quite different from statutory provisions authorizing a district court to trans-
fer an action to any other district where it might have been brought when
such transfer is in the interest of justice and the convenience to the parties
and witnesses [Emphasis added.].15
The Court noted that whether or not dismissal under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens would have been appropriate, the purpose of
1404(a) was to grant a broad power of transfer for the convenience of
the parties and witnesses in the interest of justice. " The Court further
stated that a lesser showing of inconvenience is necessary under 1404 (a)
than would have been necessary under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, noting that 1404 (a) deleted the harshest portion of the old rule
when it did away with the requirement of dismissal of the action. "When
the harshest part of the doctrine is excised by the statute, it can hardly be
called mere codification.' '
The Norwood decision, however, did not address itself to the question
of whether 1404(a) supersedes dismissal under forum non conveniens.
'The Reviser's notes, as quoted in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 34 (1955), state that
"[s]ubsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens .... "
"Sypert v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 172 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. I1. 1958), mandamus denied, 266
F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959); Grubs v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,
189 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mont. 1960).
'"Phillip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 286 F.2d 782 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961); Healy v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
' Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822
(1955); Dairy Industries Supply Ass'n v. La Buy, 207 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1953).
'2349 U.S. 29 (1955).
1s349 U.S. at 33.
14 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
15Id. at 1011.
'"Jiffy Lubricator Co., Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
' Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949).
[Vol. 34
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Although it would seem obvious that the transfer provision would be
inapplicable under circumstances in which the alternate forum is not a
federal district court and, therefore, would have no effect on forum non
conveniens, s there is authority to the effect that where the statute has
applicability, dismissal is no longer available as a remedy. Frequently, the
ends of justice will be better served by application of the milder remedy of
transfer," and it is difficult to see how 1404(a) could be construed to
allow dismissal.21 Nevertheless, in rare cases dismissal may continue to be
the more appropriate remedy.
The question of the extent to which a court's discretion under 1404 (a)
is reviewable is complicated by the fact that the grant or denial of a
transfer motion is an interlocutory order and is not appealable;' once
final judgment is reached, the issue of transfer is likely to become moot."4
The real question, therefore, is whether mandamus is available as an
immediate remedy to abuse of discretion." The courts are in hopeless con-
flict on this point," although the trend seems to be away from allowing
interlocutory review, because the discretion of the trial court is virtually
never disturbed, and such review causes undue delay in the proceedings.'
Prior to 1960, a majority of federal courts permitted transfer to a dis-
trict where jurisdiction could not have been obtained over the defendant
or where venue would not have been proper, providing the defendant
sought transfer and consented to the jurisdiction and venue.2 But, in 1960,
the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Blaski20 expressly overruled this position
in situations where venue would have been improper in the transferee
forum and implicitly overruled it in situations where jurisdiction over the
defendant could not be obtained. In the face of a vigorous dissent, 1 the
majority of the Court reasoned that any other conclusion would result in
discrimination against plaintiffs."
"8See, Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1956).
" Collins v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
2
'A companion section, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1964), allows the alternate remedy of dismissal
where the original venue was improper.
21 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 669 (1965).
22 C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 141 (1963).
2 id. at 145-46.
2 4 Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Hugh Breeding, Inc., 247 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 880 (1957).
IF. JAMEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE 669 (1965).
21 See, 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.7 (Wright ed.
1960).
27 See, All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (3d Cir. 1952).
2 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 669 (1965). See, e.g., Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1951); Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957).
29363 U.S. 335 (1960).
" It has been suggested that the decision and its reasoning is applicable only to venue. See, 46
IOWA L. REV. 661 (1965). The general consensus, however, is to the contrary. See, 57 N.W.U. L.
REV. 456 (1962).
" See, Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), a companion case to Hoffman.32For a criticism of the Hoffman result, see, F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 670-71 (1965).
"This, it is submitted, is unfortunate today when the greatest need is for rules which do tend to
secure the optimum place of trial and to substitute rational guides to that end for the sterile and
mechanical doctrines of the power myth."
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II. THE LAW TO BE APPLIED
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the Supreme Court held that:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
federal general common law.'4
In Erie suit was brought in the federal district court of New York for an
alleged tort in Pennsylvania. Holding that Pennsylvania law was appli-
cable, the Court did not explain whether this law was applicable because
the federal court must apply the choice of law rule of New York or
because the federal court was applying its own choice of law rule."' Three
years later in Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,
Inc.,'" the Court resolved this question, holding that in a diversity suit
the conflict of laws rule to be applied is that of the state in which the
district court sits. The reasoning of the Klaxon court, therefore, rested
squarely on the major premise of Erie:
[T]he desirability of federal uniformity and policy was outweighed by the
consideration that federal courts should not afford an opportunity to escape
the judgment which would prevail in a state court. "
The advent of 1404(a) gave rise to new problems of choice of law,
i.e., problems of the law that was to govern following transfer." In tort
cases, these problems traditionally have been resolved by strict application
of the vested rights oriented rule adopted by the Restatement,39 lex loci
delicti." Under lex loci delicti, the law of the place where a tort is com-
mitted governs both the existence of a cause of action and the extent of
liability therefor."' The rule was based on the theory that a tort is con-
sidered to vest its victim with a locally created cause of action enforceable
in any jurisdiction where suit is brought, " and found its development and
application in neutral forums where the pertinent facts had occurred
elsewhere.43 Because of its advantages of simplicity, predictability, and
discouragement of forum shopping, the application of lex loci delicti was
approved by the Supreme Court in 1903."
Recent aviation cases have greatly emphasized the shortcomings of
lex loci, e.g., constitutional problems of the arbitrariness of the indiscrimi-
"3304 U.S. 64 (1938), Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1487.
4304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
" H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 24-25 (4th ed. 1964).
"6313 U.S. 487 (1941).
"7Id. at 25. Cf., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
"See, Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REv.
341 (1960).
"RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
"See, Larsen, Conflict of Laws, 22 Sw. L.J. 190 (1968).
41 H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 165 (4th ed. 1964).
4 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903).
"' See, Note, Wrongful Death-Conflict of Laws-Significant Contacts vs. Lex Loci, 34 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 309 (1968).
"Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903).
[Vol. 3 4
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
nate application of the law of the place of the tort" and the idea that the
law of the forum most intimately involved with an action should govern."
The fortuitous nature of air crashes,47 the fact that the planes involved in
air crashes may spend but a few moments in a state's airspace," and the
fact that the speed of planes makes it such that the locus of the tort and
the locus of the resulting injury, if at all determinable, may be in differ-
ent states,49 all point to the unsoundness of a mechanical application of
lex loci. The landmark case illustrating dissatisfaction with the traditional
conflicts rule is the New York Court of Appeals decision in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc." The Kilberg court, although allowing the cause
of action to be based on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute under
lex loci delicti, characterized the Massachusetts damage limitation as pro-
cedural, and, since strong New York public policy 1 prohibits limitations of
recoverable damages in wrongful death actions, the court held that New
York law as to damages would govern. In a companion case to Kilberg,
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,"5 the Second Circuit considered the question
of whether New York could constitutionally split the cause of action or
whether full faith and credit had to be given to the entire Massachusetts
wrongful death statute. The court held that due process did not guarantee
Northeast Airlines a vested right to the application of Massachusetts law in
New York, and stated that "a state with substantial ties to a transaction in
dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in the application of its
own rules of law.""
Two years after Kilberg, in Babcock v. Jackson,' New York completely
severed lex loci from applicability in wrongful death actions and adopted
a more flexible rule of significance contacts, i.e., that the law to govern is
the law of the state with the greatest interest in the issues before the court.
The Babcock court found that, with the exception of the locus of the
injury, all significant contacts were in New York. In Kell v. Henderson,"
however, the New York court held the Babcock principle inapplicable to
an action arising out of an automobile accident occurring in New York
involving Canadian citizens. The court refused to allow defendants to
amend their answer to plead the Ontario guest statute because the Bab-
cock decision was not intended to change the established New York rule
that a guest, whether a resident of New York or not, has a cause of action
' Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 341
(1960); B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3-77 (1963).
48 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (SECOND) § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).47 See, Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 386, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750
(1965), rev'd, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 226 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965), where
airliner disintegrated over the Delaware-Maryland border.48 Larsen, Conflict of Laws, 22 Sw. L.J. 190 (1968).
49 Note, Wrongful Death--Conflict of Laws-Significant Contacts vs. Lex Loci, 34 J. AIR L.
& COM. 309 (1968).
509 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
" N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16, states that, in wrongful death actions, recovery "shall not be sub-
ject to any statutory limit."
52 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cit. 1962).
'lid. at 559.
54 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
55263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
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for personal injuries against a host in an accident occurring in New York."
The constitutionality of abandonment of lex loci was upheld in 1962 by
the Supreme Court in Richards v. United States,"7 the Court holding that
after a consideration of the competing interests, the forum state could
constitutionally apply the law of any state having significant contact with
the tort involved. The Court thereby recognized the inadequacies of its
1903 Slater decision."8 Nevertheless, the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
remains the established rule in the vast majority of the states and is not
likely to be soon abandoned. The Texas Supreme Court, for example,
recently refused to alter a strict application of lex loci delicti in an action
in which all significant contacts, with the exception of the locus of the
accident, were in Texas."
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL TRANSFER PROCEEDINGS
A. In General
The present discussion of proper considerations in federal transfer
proceedings can best be presented on a three-fold basis: (1) the "permis-
sible" considerations founded both in case law and statutory requirement;
(2) factors which weigh heavily upon any determination made by a
court in a federal transfer proceeding but are not openly recognized as
valid considerations; and (3) the importance to be attributed to a defend-
ant's offer to pay the reasonable travel costs of plaintiffs, their witnesses,
and counsel incurred as a result of the transfer.
Primary attention will be given to the underlying considerations not
openly recognized and to the effect of the defendant's offer to pay the
transfer expenses. The "permissible" considerations are simply the
statutory convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of
justice and those factors laid down in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert.
These will be considered only in passing.
The effect of a defendant's offer to incur reasonable transfer expenses
can be determined by analysis of a line of cases arising out of the crash of
a military charter flight near Ardmore, Oklahoma, on 22 April 196600
The airplane carried ninety-two soldiers and six employees of American
Flyers Airline Corporation, defendant in the actions. The plaintiffs con-
sisted of survivors, guardians of survivors, and administrators of the estates
56But see, Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1965) extending the Babcock principle to wrongful death cases.
57 369 U.S. 1 (1962). Cf., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
" Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903).
59Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 17,896 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968).
6 Dawkins v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 66 C 2165 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Lora v.
American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 66 C 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Scaramuzzo v. American
Flyers Airline Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline
Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Turner v. American Flyers Airline Corporation,
No. 66 C 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Bilgen v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 67-256-AAH
(C.D. Cal. 1967); Dolecki v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 46858 (N.D. Cal. 1967);
Farrell v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, 42 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Vasquez v.
American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 45639 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Wright v. American
Flyers Airline Corporation and Helton v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, 263 F. Supp. 865
(D.S.C. 1967).
[Vol. 34
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of the deceased soldier-passengers. In all of these cases American Flyers
moved for transfer to the Eastern District of Oklahoma, predicting the
motion on an offer to pay the reasonable travel costs of plaintiffs, their wit-
nesses, and counsel. Only in Farrell v. American Flyers and the Scbmidt v.
American Flyers and Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers cases was transfer de-
nied. In the other eight cases transfer was granted, contingent upon the
defendant honoring its offer to pay expenses. "
B. Underlying Considerations
An analysis of transfer cases indicates that precedent takes a back seat
in this area of the law because the peculiar facts of each case are deter-
minative and the doctrine of stare decisis is of secondary importance."
One may justifiably surmise that concepts such as "the convenience of
parties and witnesses" and "the interest of justice" are often used to "dress
up" an opinion once a decision has been reached and that only then is
applicable precedent cited to support the decision. Often, the determinative
factors are not discussed or even mentioned in the opinion, and to further
confuse the issue, such factors are sometimes disposed of as "not control-
ling" in arriving at the decision. In short, there are many criteria, other
than convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice,
that loom in the shadows behind the decisions in federal transfer pro-
ceedings.
1. Convenience of Counsel
Once a decision has been reached, the court will support it by citing
one of two lines of cases, either the liberal Norwood viewpoint or the more
strict Gilbert rule. For example, it is often stated as a general rule that
convenience of counsel is to be given little or no weight in determining
the priority of transfer under 1404 (a) ,63 and this proposition has been used
both to support the grant of a 1404 (a) motion" and to support a denial.6"
The convenience of counsel rule has been used in situations representing
inconvenience to the counsel himself" and in situations representing
inconvenience to the client in having to employ additional counsel in the
transferee forum."7 Although there is no case law recognizing the conveni-
ence of counsel as a factor demanding even momentary pause in a court's
61Dawkins v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 66 C 2165 (N.D. 11. 1966); Lora
v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 66 C 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Turner v. American
Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 66 C 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Bilgen v. American Flyers Airline
Corporation, No. 67-256-AAH (C.D. Cal. 1967); Dolecki v. American Flyers Airline Corporation,
No. 46858 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Vasquez v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, No. 45639 (N.D.
Cal. 1967); Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corporation and Helton v. American Flyers Airline
Corporation, 263 F. Supp. 865 (D.S.C. 1967).
62United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), aff'd in part,
modified in part on other grounds, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951
(1964).
" Sypert v. Miner, 266 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959);
Grubs v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mont. 1960); Cressman v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Molloy v. Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 130 F. Supp.
265 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Henderson v. American Airlines, 91 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).4 Thomas v. Silver Creek Coal Co., 264 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
" Roller Bearing Co. v. Bearings, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
6 Mims v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 257 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1966).
"
7 Patterson v. Louisville and N. R.R., 182 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
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determination in a federal transfer proceeding, a practical consideration of
transfer cases points to the conclusion that the convenience of counsel is
often given weight in both granting and denying transfer. Protracted
litigation cases, such as Farrell, which involve substantial judgments
represent examples of situations in which the convenience of counsel
should merit utmost consideration. Although air crash cases usually do
involve protracted litigation, there are only a handful of legal experts
that represent plaintiffs in these cases. Thus, inconvenience to such counsel
may impair a client's case and restrict his right to select counsel of his
own choosing." The well-settled convenience of counsel rule should be
modified to accommodate the increasing number of protracted litigation
and substantial damage cases typically represented by air crash actions.
As these press to the forefront, a corresponding modification of the rule
will become even more necessary.
2. Time and Money
The two foremost considerations for a plaintiff in bringing any action
are (1) obtaining the maximum recoverable damages and (2) doing so
with a minimum of delay. The defendant, on the other hand, typically
desires to minimize his loss and to delay that loss as long as possible. For
example, a plaintiff faced with the choice between bringing his action
in New York or Oklahoma may well choose the New York forum where
jury verdicts are substantially higher than in Oklahoma, even though the
dockets of the New York courts are much more crowded and a speedier
trial could be had in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma courts may, however, be
much more appealing to the defendant."' The Farrell case involved this
conflict of interests. It is submitted that one reason the plaintiff filed his
claim in New York was the increased likelihood of a more advantageous
result as reflected by that state's history of high damage awards in air
crash cases. The defendant, on the other hand, sought transfer in order to
avoid such an adverse result. Federal courts have consistently held, how-
ever, that the possibility that higher damages may be secured in one
district rather than another, from either party's viewpoint, is entitled to
no consideration in passing on a motion for change of venue."0 Further,
the relative liberality of juries in different jurisdictions in personal injury
actions is not to be considered in determining whether a defendant's
motion to transfer should be granted. 1
On the other hand, federal courts have held that a prompt trial is rele-
vant to the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of
justice and accordingly should be given consideration in determining
transfer under 1404 (a)."z Because the plaintiff originally chose the forum,
" This position was taken in the decision in the Farrell case as well as in the Schmidt and
Scaramuzzo decisions.
"
9 See, Martin, The Defendant's View of Montreal, 33 J. Ai. L. & CoM. 538 (1968).
"
0Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 141 F. Supp. 692 (D. Minn. 1956); Chicago, R.I.
& P. R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. de-nied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955).
"' Cox v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
"aFannin v. Jones, 229 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 938 (1956).
[Vol. 34
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his inconvenience is generally of no moment in the consideration of a
1404 (a) motion by the defendant." Following this reasoning to its logical
conclusion, the result is reached that since a speedy trial is primarily a
convenience to the plaintiff and not the defendant, the possibility of a
quicker disposition of a case should not be given consideration on a
defendant's motion to transfer. But such has not been the case. At least
outwardly, the federal courts have closed their eyes to both the reason
for bringing a claim in a particular forum and the reason for a defend-
ant's desire to remove it. This apparent disparity between fact and prac-
tice raises the possibility that statutory relief is needed if the case is as the
written opinions would have us believe.
3. The Question of Power and Dockets
Another factor given considerable (but unmentioned) consideration in
federal transfer proceedings is the individualistic attitude of federal district
courts." Each federal district court is a separate entity having neither
jurisdiction beyond a state line nor inherent authority to transfer a cause
from one district to another." Thus, in many cases, transfer of an action
from one district to another becomes not so much a question of venue as
a question of power."0 The main concern is conditions in the proposed
transferee district that may arise from a transfer of the action. Bitterness
between federal jurisdictions is to be avoided. Transgression by the trans-
feror into the sacred domain of the transferee calls for a high degree of
judicial diplomacy lest the question of power represented by change of
venue should effect righteous judicial indignation rather than the desired
expeditious judicial economy. Presumably, a federal district court would
prefer not to have a cause transferred into its district, simply because of
the desire for an uncluttered docket. The foresaid judicial diplomacy
necessitates inspection of the dockets of the proposed transferee courts.
Absent extreme circumstances, it would seem that notable discrepancy in
the dockets of the two courts should exist in order to safely avoid the
embarrassment of transgression. Accordingly, there are federal transfer
decisions on the issue of calendar conditions ranging within the full spec-
trum of circumstances. For example, decisions have ranged from the
extreme position that no court should look to docket conditions in order
to serve its own conscience," through the view that such considerations are
relevant,"- to the other extreme that it is mandatory for a district court
to take judicial notice of the congested condition of its calendar.' Inter-
estingly enough, the cases holding that the docket factor is relevant have
"
5 Heiser v. United Air Lines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
74 See, Hoffman v. Blaski, 365 U.S. 355 (1960).
" Felchlin v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
76 United States v. 11 Cases, More or Less, Ido-Pheno-Chon, 94 F. Supp. 925 (D. Or. 1950).
17Fannin v. Jones, 229 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1956), cet. denied,.351 U.S. 938 (1956).
7 Hostetler v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 164 F. Supp. 72. (W.D. Pa. 1958:).
79 Sypert v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 172 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. I1. 1958), mandamus denied, 266
F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1959), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959).
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described it as "not controlling,"'. "not necessarily controlling,""' "a slight
factor,""s and "not alone sufficient to justify transfer."8 In one case eigh-
teen months,8 4 and in another fifteen months," difference in calendars was
deemed to "clearly" merit weight in determining transfer. The case with
which a uniform rule relating to standards of docket discrepancies could
be formulated indicates by the widely differing results that something more
than court calendars was the basis of many transfer decisions.
It is quite possible that transferee indignation may result in a remand
from the transferee court; this principle of remand is well entrenched in
federal practice. When it appears that the transferor court did not have
the authority to enter an order for transfer, the transferee court may
inquire into the question, notwithstanding the principle that courts should
not sit in review of the orders of other courts of equal and coordinate
jurisdiction.' Sufficient grounds for remand have been lack of service of
process,s7 lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in the remanding
court,8 and lack of plaintiff's capacity to bring the action in the remanding
court.8 9
4. Pre-Trial Discovery
One other factor in federal transfer proceedings which is of paramount
importance in air crash cases should be briefly mentioned. Although not
unique in air crash actions, pre-trial discovery problems are common to
them. Protracted litigation is the obvious result of the majority of air
crashes because, in contrast to automobile accident litigation and, to a
lesser degree, railroad and commercial bus accident cases, air crash cases
involve unique problems of discovery which are due not only to the air
crash per se, but also to the more affluent clientele of airlines who cor-
respondingly merit higher damage awards. Also unique are the widespread
domiciles of the passengers and witnesses, if any, and the problems en-
countered in obtaining government records. These varied and perplexing
problems in pre-trial discovery procedures have made it necessary to vest
in the federal courts broad discretion to control, schedule and establish
timetables for discovery in such cases." In conjunction with this broad
discretion, a five-step proposal has been made: (1) Early identification
"Petition of Texas Co., 116 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), afl'd, 213 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954), petition denied, 220 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1955); Clen-
denin v. United Fruit Co., 214 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Willetts v. General Tel. Directory
Co., 38 F.R.D. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"Pharma-Craft Corp. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 144 F. Supp. 298 (M.D. Ga. 1956), mandamus
denied, 236 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1956).
82Henderson v. American Airlines, 91 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
"8Pontes v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
S4 A. Olinick and Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966).
85Schneider v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6Wilson v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 101 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
87 Id.
"8Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951
(1951).
89Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1963).
"o See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351
(1960); Seminar On Practice and Procedure Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
F.R.D. 37 (1960).
[ Vol. 3 4
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
of the "big" case, (2) its assignment to one judge for all purposes and
his prompt assumption of control, (3) definition of the issues (which, it
is increasingly recognized, should be accomplished through pre-trial con-
ferences), (4) containing discovery within the boundaries set by the
defined issues and the discovery rules, and (5) careful planning of the pro-
cedure to be followed at the trial and full utilization of tested trial tech-
niques." The pooling of discovery is particularly essential in air crash cases
and, obviously, has special applicability in federal transfer proceedings.
Where a number of plaintiffs in a particular action are jointly repre-
sented by counsel specializing in air crash litigation, or where a motion for
transfer is predicated at least partially on the contention that a number
of actions growing out of the same crash are pending in the transferee
district, the pre-trial and discovery steps taken in the transferee district
would be relevant and applicable to the case at hand."2
C. The Defendant's Offer
A perusal of the cases indicates that a determination of transfer is one
of balancing the interests of the opposing parties. Often, the Gilbert rule
that the balance must weigh heavily in favor of the defendant would no
longer seem to be applicable. The courts would seem to have broad discre-
tion in this area and in a close case an otherwise insignificant detail might
tip the balance of interests in favor of transfer. Relying on Norwood and
related cases and turning to the issue of how much weight the courts
have attributed to the defendant American Flyer's offer to pay the rea-
sonable expenses of the opposing parties, their witnesses, and counsel
incurred as a result of the transfer, one may safely make at least one
generalization. If the interests are closely balanced, then the defendant's
offer will merely tip the balanced scales and thus be accorded little weight
by the courts. But if absent such an offer by the defendant, the balance of
interests is clearly in favor of the plaintiffs and a court nevertheless grants
transfer contingent upon the defendant's payment of the opposing
parties' transfer expenses, then such an offer would, without a doubt, be
a significant factor in determining transfer.
1. The Cases
As noted, there are many factors involved in federal transfer proceed-
ings which, although not expressly accorded a great deal of importance,
nevertheless are often determinative of the decision granting or denying
transfer. How then can the question of the relative importance of a
defendant's offer to pay the expenses incurred by a plaintiff as a result
of the transfer made pursuant to 1404 (a) be resolved? The answer to this
question requires a comparison of the three cases that have denied transfer
in the face of the defendant's offer with the eight cases that have granted
transfer contingent upon fulfilment of the offer. Fortunately, there is a
"Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351,
373 (1960).
"See Hoffman v. Blaski, 365 U.S. 355 (1960).
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thread of reasoning that winds consistenly through each respective line
of cases.
In deciding to deny transfer the court in Farrell merely reiterated the
reasoning set forth in its Scaramuzzo5 and Schmidt decisions." In Scara-
muzzo, which is typical of the cases that have denied transfer, the court
proceeded on the basis (1) that the burden of proving the need for
transfer is on the defendant," (2) that the Gilbert criteria raised by
the defendant in support of its motion must be weighed against the tradi-
tional right of the plaintiff to choose the forum,"6 and (3) that the balance
of interests must be strongly in the defendant's favor."7 The court felt
that the grant of transfer would merely shift the inconvenience from the
defendant to the plaintiff and that such a situation would not merit trans-
fer." First, all of the survivors, who were also fact witnesses on the issue of
liability, resided outside the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Second, the
medical witnesses and records, which would be determinative of the issue
of damages, were in Texas and New York. Further, when the inconveni-
ence to plaintiff's witnesses, who were largely New York residents, was
taken into consideration the interests weighed heavily against transfer.
The test in ascertaining the importance of witnesses, then, was one of
quality and not quantity." To defendant's argument that the transfer
would effect a consolidation of the actions and hence result in substantial
savings of time and money, the Scaramuzzo court replied that because
different courts were likely to interpret the standards for granting trans-
fer in varying ways, it was unlikely that all of the actions would be trans-
ferred to Oklahoma. It noted that even if the liability issues could be
consolidated, the damage issue would require separate trials. ' Finally,
there was the possibility that an Oklahoma decision on the issues of liabil-
ity would be determinative in New York'°' and that consequently the
benefits of consolidation could be achieved without consolidating the
causes.
Unlike the Schmidt, Scaramuzzo, and Farrell courts, which proceeded
on the Ryan theory"' that transfer is not to be allowed unless the balance
of interests is strongly in favor of the movant, the South Carolina court
in Wright and Helton noted that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not an
absolute right but merely a factor to be considered by the court.'" The
Wright reasoning, which is typical of the cases granting transfer, was
founded on the concept that the plaintiff's choice of forum will be deter-
" Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers, 260 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
" Schmidt v. American Flyers, 260 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
9" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
"Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851
(1950).
97 Id.
"SMiracle Stretch Underwear Corp. v. Alba Hosiery Mills, 136 F. Supp. 508, 511 (D. Del.
1955).
"°Mims v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 257 F. Supp. 648, 655 (D.S.C. 1966).
'0' 136 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
''Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1966).
'Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
... Oltman v. Currie, 231 F. Supp. 654, 655 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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minative only "when other factors are somewhat equally balanced." 1"
The Wright line of cases stands for the proposition that once the prelimi-
nary requirement that the action originally could have been brought in the
proposed transferee district has been established, a court has wide latitude
in determining transfer.
The court laid down other guidelines: (1) The convenience of wit-
nesses is to be determined by the quality of the witnesses and not by their
number;s (2) Convenience of counsel is not to be considered; (3)
Often, the place where the cause of action arose is the most convenient
forum." ' These guidelines pointed to the conclusion that:
[T]he interests of justice and the substantial conveniences--especially con-
sidering the offer of the defendent to defray the expenses of the plaintiffs
and their witnesses-favor the transfer [Emphasis added.].
Unlike the New York decisions which concluded that the key witnesses
were the survivors, the Wright court was of the persuasion that since
only four of the fifteen surviors were awake at the time of the crash and
only one of the survivors was deemed important enough to be called as a
witness at the CAB hearing, these witnesses were relatively unimportant.
Also, no important witnesses were located in South Carolina. Thus, the
important witnesses, both qualitatively and quantitatively, resided in or
around Ardmore, Oklahoma. In applying the second guideline, the court
said that South Carolina would follow lex loci delicti; thus Oklahoma
was the place where the cause of action arose and Oklahoma law was
applicable.' The court noted that New York has a new doctrine in the
area of conflict-of-laws' that since the place of airplane accidents is
fortuitous, it is the duty of the forum state to apply its own law as to
the issues of liability in order to protect its own citizens.' South Carolina,
however, has not adopted this rule. Thus, if transfer were granted, the
law of Oklahoma would apply both to the issue of liability and to the
issue of damages. The ends of justice would, therefore, be better served.
Additionally, the court noted that a quicker trial was more likely in
Oklahoma because the courts of that state were not as congested. Further,
it was possible that substantially all of the cases could be consolidated in
104 Forester v. Elk Towing Co., 242 F. Supp. 549, 550 (W.D. Pa. 1965); White v. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp., 86 F. Supp. 910 (E.D.S.C. 1949).
'e Glickenhaus v. Lytton Financial Corp., 205 F. Supp. 102 (D. Del. 1962).
"°Henderson v. American Airlines, 91 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Grubs v. Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mont.-1960); Parkhill Produce Co. v. Pecos Valley South-
ern Ry., 196 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
... Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D.S.C. 1967).
'O'Hauton v. The Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937); McDaniel v. McDaniel,
243 S.C. 286, 133 S.E.2d 809 (1963); Smith v. Southern Railway, 87 S.C. 136, 69 S.E. 18 (1910);
Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 110 F. Supp. 811 (D.S.C. 1953).
110 It is possible that the court misconstrued the application of the new New York conflicts rule.
See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). However, the correctness of
the court's interpretation is of no moment to the present discussion. What is important is the man-
ner in which various considerations were actually weighted in determining transfer. For this reason,
this discussion will proceed on the basis of the South Carolina court's interpretation.
. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., -9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 179 (1961); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 2d 1.
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Oklahoma. The court did not discount the possibility of consolidation
merely because some courts would refuse to grant transfer."'
Although the Wright court could not ignore the fact that it would be
more convenient for the plaintiffs if the trials were to take place in South
Carolina and that the transfer would impose a financial burden upon
them, the court reasoned that any burden was largely alleviated by the
defendant's offer to defray expenses.
2. Distinguishing Points
The clearest distinguishing feature between the two lines of cases is to
be found in the standards applied by the different courts in determining
transfer. In denying transfer, the New York courts applied the stricter
rule that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be lightly disturbed and
that the balance of interests must be strongly in favor of the defendant
before transfer will be granted. On the other hand, the cases that granted
transfer applied the more liberal Norwood rule, which requires a lesser
showing of inconvenience on the part of the defendant and gives the court
broader discretion in determining transfer. In none of the cases in the
latter group did the courts express the opinion that the balance of interests
weighed strongly in favor of the defendant.
Another distinguishing feature is the difference in attitude toward the
question of consolidation. The New York courts viewed the hope of con-
solidation of the cases in the Oklahoma forum as "illusory" and as "a
fanciful hope of the defendant." However, the courts that granted trans-
fer were moved by defendant's consolidation argument. There are at least
three reasons for this difference of opinion.
First, at the time the decisions were reached on the transfer motions,
there were thirty-three cases pending that arose out of the Ardmore crash.
Eighteen of these cases were pending in New York, and the remainder were
scattered throughout numerous jurisdictions. Thus, the New York courts
were probably of the opinion that consolidation would best be effected
in New York, viz. if transfer were to be granted at all, it should be granted
to and not from New York.
[I]f the defendant, for its own convenience and benefit, must persist in its
efforts to collect all the cases arising from this accident in one jurisdiction,
then good sense and equity would dictate that an attempt be made to have
all the Oklahoma cases transferred to New York. This makes even more
sense when it is realized that the majority of the cases in Oklahoma involve
claimants from other areas than Oklahoma. 1 '
The courts granting transfer, however, did not have numerous crash cases
pending in their jurisdictions and readily conceded that the chances of
achieving consolidation were far more promising in Oklahoma than in
their own jurisdiction.
Second, the different conflict-of-laws rules applied by the courts greatly
.. Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL, 364 U.S. 19 (1964); Cressman v. United Air Lines,
158 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
s Affidavit of Frederick C. Stern to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, 67 Civ. 1630, sworn to 4 May 1967.
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affected the consolidation argument of the defendant. Under the New
York rule, even if transfer were allowed, New York and not Oklahoma
law would apply to the issue of liability. It would not be in the interest of
sound judicial administration for Oklahoma courts to be forced to inter-
pret New York law when a simple denial of transfer would prevent this
problem from arising.
[I]n cases . . . where the defendant seeks transfer, the transferee district
court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied
if there had been no change of venue. A change of venue under §1404(a)
generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms."4
Further, the New York cases in which New York law had to be applied
could not be consolidated with the other cases in which Oklahoma law
would be applied. The courts granting transfer, however, did not have a
conflict-of-laws rule similar to that of New York, and cases transferred to
Oklahoma by these courts would be wholly subject to Oklahoma law.
Obviously, the consolidation argument of the defendant would carry
much more weight with the courts outside of New York, and these courts
recognized the possibility of consolidation as a strong argument for
transfer.
Third, although the rule is well-settled that the convenience of counsel
is not a factor that should be considered in the determination of a 1404 (a)
motion, as noted supra, this factor is one which in many instances should
not be ignored by a court in a federal transfer proceeding. Interestingly
enough, the convenience of counsel rule is conspicuously present in the
opinions of the courts which granted transfer, while such a statement
is conspicuously absent from the opinions of the New York courts. Foreign
counsel arguing Oklahoma law before an Oklahoma court would obviously
not suffer the inconvenience of his New York counterpart who would
be forced to argue the law of a foreign jurisdiction.
Another distinguishing feature is the differing opinions as to which
were the important or key witnesses. The New York courts applied a con-
flict-of-laws rule which operates on the theory that since the locale of an
airplane is wholly fortuitous, it is the court's duty to protect New York
citizens by applying New York law to the issue of damages. Conse-
quently, the key witnesses were not the employees of the defendant but,
rather, the survivors of the accident and the residents of New York who
were plaintiff's damage witnesses.
[I]f the determination of this motion were to rest on the balancing of the
convenience of the fact witnesses on the liability issue alone, the scales would
not favor transfer; add to the weight against transfer, the inconvenience to
the plaintiff's witnesses on the issue of damages and the scales weigh heavily
against transfer.'15
As most of the survivors resided outside of Oklahoma, New York courts
were as readily accessible as were the Oklahoma courts. The New York
'"Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
"
5 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 746, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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courts further observed that because defendant's "important" Oklahoma
witnesses were largely its employees and under its control, they could be
brought to New York at a minimum of inconvenience to the defendant.
Hence, the courts dismissed the defendant's convenience argument as one
based on a quantitative rather than a qualitative test. The courts which
granted transfer, not operating under a conflicts rule similar to that of
New York, found the defendant's convenience argument to be well-
founded. These granting courts were strongly influenced by the fact that
virtually no key witnesses resided in their respective jurisdictions and they
reached the conclusion for reasons previously stated that the survivors
were not the important witnesses in this instance.
Another distinguishing feature is the previously discussed problem of
pretrial discovery in protracted litigation cases. Undoubtedly, the New
York courts considered the availability of plaintiff's damage witnesses in
New York to be significant. The courts granting transfer, on the other
hand, were probably moved by the possibility of pooling discovery through
consolidation in Oklahoma.
3. Case Analysis
The attitude of the court and not the correctness of the decision will
determine the issue at hand. Whether or not all relevant factors were
properly weighed is not of importance to a determination of the effect
the defendant's offer to pay all reasonable and necessary transportation
expenses of the plaintiffs, their counsel and their witnesses had on the
decision of the courts. The relevant consideration is the manner in which
the courts believed that the interests of the opposing parties were balanced
notwithstanding the offer of the defendant. The analysis of the Farrell,
Schmidt, and Scaramuzzo decisions indicates that in light of the reasoning
used to support the decisions in these cases and the application of the
stricted rule of Ford Motor Company v. Ryan,'' the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and the interest of justice were thought to be strongly
in favor of the plaintiffs. Conversely, in the Wright line of cases, the
application of the more liberal Norwood rule points to a close division in
the interests of the opposing parties. Transfer in these cases was granted
only upon an expressed condition.'
Consequently, the Farrell, Schmidt, and Scaramuzzo decisional theory
would not allow an offer to pay expenses to "tip the scales" in a situation
in which the balance of interests is strongly in favor of the opposing
party. Not only is this consistent with New York precedent"" but the
recent New York conflicts rule appears to weigh so heavily against trans-
fer of air crash cases from New York federal courts, that it would neces-
." Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
.17 It should be noted that there is adequate precedent for conditional transfers under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1964). Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 836(1955); Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 177 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Nacona
Leather Goods Co. v. A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc., 159 F. Supp. 269. (D. Del. 1958); May v. The
Steel Navigator, 152 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Crawford v. The Shirley Lykes, 148 F. Supp.
958 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
See, Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 177 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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sarily overshadow any attempt by a defendant airline to obtain a transfer
contingent on its offer to pay expenses.
One additional point is pertinent. Although the proof on the issue of
liability will be the same for all plaintiffs, each plaintiff has a separate and
individual problem with respect to establishing the proof of damages sus-
tained. This will require each plaintiff to produce his own witnesses to
establish the damages sustained by that plaintiff. In most instances these
witnesses would reside within the jurisdiction of the courts of the plain-
tiff's home state (New York, here) or within convenient distance. It
would be manifestly unfair to require the plaintiff to transport these wit-
nesses to Oklahoma. Although the defendant offered to pay the transfer
expenses, this offer may be an empty one because many of the witnesses
who may have to testify on the issue of damages may be unwilling or
unable to travel to Oklahoma. Since they cannot be compelled to attend a
trial in Oklahoma, the plaintiffs might be put to serious disadvantage
because it may be impossible for them to establish the necessary proof to
support their claim of damages. Although it is true that these witnesses'
depositions may be taken in New York, the Oklahoma court would not
have the benefit of hearing and observing them at an actual trial.
Decisions permitting transfer under 1404(a), conditioned upon the
defendant's offer to pay expenses, notwithstanding the fact that the
relevant interests are balanced strongly in favor of the plaintiff, are the
exception and not the rule. Although there are cases reaching this result,""
the better view would seem to be to the contrary.
In contrast, the Wright and Helton cases illustrate situations in which
the interests of the opposing parties are closely balanced. If the interests
of the opposing parties were perfectly balanced on a set of legal scales,
with each party's interests offsetting the other's, then the addition to the
defendant's side of the scales of a consideration such as the offer to pay
transfer expenses would tip the scales in favor of transfer. But Wright
and Helton indicate more than this; the offer may affect the scales to a
degree disproportionate to the actual weight of the offer, because it not
only adds its own weight to the defendant's side of the scales but also
removes the "weight" of financial burden from the plaintiff's side of the
scales.
The Lora and Turner cases indicate that transfer would have been
granted even without defendant's offer. Therefore, they add very little
to the discussion. Transfer in these cases, however, was granted on the
expressed condition that the defendant honor its proposed offer. Airlines
are thus put on notice that in cases where they make an offer to pay trans-
fer expenses, transfer, if granted, will be contingent upon an honoring
of the offer, regardless of how the interests of the parties are balanced.
4. Concluding
In summary, an offer to pay reasonable transportation and maintenance
costs of the plaintiffs, their witnesses, and their counsel made by the
9 Allied Petro-Products, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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defendant pursuant to a 1404 (a) transfer action will have its most pro-
nounced effect in those cases where, in the absence of such an offer, trans-
fer could not be permitted due to the financial burden placed on the
plaintiff. Such an offer will have its least pronounced effect in transfer
proceedings in which the balance of interests is strongly in favor of the
plaintiff. In those courts favoring the more lenient spirit of Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, the "offer" will have considerable impact, but application
of the Norwood rule necessitates a closer balancing of interests which
correspondingly gives rise to situations more favorable to the effectiveness
of the "offer." The more strict theory of Ford Motor Company v. Ryan,
which requires plaintiff's choice of forum not to be lightly disturbed,
negates the effectiveness of an offer to pay reasonable transfer expenses.
To complicate matters further, each federal transfer case is decided
on its peculiar facts and many underlying factors not to be found in statu-
tory enactments or written case laws are often determinative of the ques-
tion of transfer. The difficulty in judging the significance accorded to such
factors hinders a prediction as to the effect of an offer to pay expenses in
a particular action. Nevertheless, it can be anticipated that the effect in
many cases will be significant.
An airline's offer to pay transfer expenses clearly falls within the spirit
of Section 403 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 195 8.12° An airline must
recognize that by the very nature of its carrying passengers from all parts
of the world it may be forced to defend litigation proceedings in widely
dispersed areas. This is not to say that an airline as a matter of law should
be said to assume such a burden and its consequences, but merely to point
out that prior recognition of a precarious situation would warrant protec-
tive measures. Any device which aids in the transfer and consolidation of
such dispersed actions qualifies in importance as a protective measure. In
this sense, the "offer" has sophistication.
IV. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:
A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
Obviously, a single trial in one district of cases involving a large number
of claims turning on common issues of law and fact is more efficient
administration of justice than multi-district litigation. Consolidation or
centralization of actions through the mechanics of a 1404 (a) transfer is
one solution to the problem of multi-district litigation. The New York
courts in the Farrell, Schmidt, and Scaramuzzo cases were, however, of
the opinion that the prospects of achieving centralization were "so dim
that the posited single trial is only a fanciful hope of the defendant.....
The decisions of the New York courts are reflective of the situations
"
0
°As a general rule, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 403 (b), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. §
1373 (1964), prohibits rebates and the allowance of any passage for compensation below the set
tariff rate. An exception is made, however, in Section 403 (b), for any persons injured or killed in
aircraft accidents and "witnesses and attorneys attending any legal investigation in which such air
carrier is interested."
... Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 813, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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in which the recently enacted Multidistrict Litigation Act (MLA) 122
should prove most useful. The act provides for the temporary transfer to
a single district of civil actions pending in multiple districts and involving
one or more common questions of fact in order to achieve centralization
of pretrial proceedings. Transfer under the MLA is made by a judicial
panel on multi-district litigation (provided for in the act) once a determi-
nation has been made that transfer "will be for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions. '  Once the pretrial proceedings are concluded, however, each
action must be remanded to the district from which it was transferred.
The MLA provides only a partial solution to the problems of multi-
district litigation, because its applicability is limited to pretrial proceedings
and has no effect upon common issues of liability. The doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel may offer a more effective solution to problems of multi-
distict litigation especially where the possibilities of centralization are
uncertain. Both the Scaramuzzo court '24 and the Sc/nnidt court recognized
the applicability of collateral estoppel.
[T]here are other ways of avoiding a multiplicity of suits and duplication of
discovery proceedings than relegating local citizens to the burdens of present-
ing their claims in remote jurisdictions. Collateral estoppel, for example, may
be available if a final judgment is rendered against defendant in one action
arising out of this crash, and protective orders under Rule 30(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are open to defendant if its fears of dupli-
cative discovery proceedings ripen into unreasonable annoyance or oppression.
Moreover, experience teaches that, as a practical matter, attorneys in multi-
plaintiff cases work out a cooperative plan with defense counsel and the
court to save time and expense inherent in duplicative discovery proceedings. 5 '
The doctrine of collateral estoppel makes it possible for issues litigated
in a previous final judgment to act conclusively upon identical issues in a
subsequent action.' It has as its foundation the public policy considera-
tion of putting an end to controversies and has historically required for its
122 82 Stat. 109, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Pub. L. 90-296, 90th Cong., S-159, 29 April 1968.
12328 U.S.C.A. § 1407(a) (1968):
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending
in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial
panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination
that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action
so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any
claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such
claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
1
24 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 750-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
"It is possible that the benefits of consolidation will be achieved even if defendant's motion to
transfer is denied. There is some authority in this Circuit which suggests that if the pending action
in the Eastern District of Oklahoma results in verdict unfavorable to the defendant, it might be
determinative of the liability issue here. See, Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,
346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966)."
125 Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See also, Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); New York State Bar Association 1966 Antitrust Law Symposi-
um, Judicial Administration of Multiple-District Treble Damage Litigation, at 55.
26 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
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application a mutuality of parties.12 ' Mutuality means that the parties to
the action must be the same or in privity with the parties to the previous
final judgment. This has the same effect as to the previously litigated issues
as the more familiar doctrine of res judicata has as to the previously liti-
gated cause of action.
The requirement of mutuality was first abandoned in the 1942 land-
mark case of Bernhard v. Bank of America. The Supreme Court of
California concluded that there was no compelling reason for the defen-
dant to be in privity in order to assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel as
long as three tests of applicability were met: (1) "Was the issue decided in
the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in
question?" (2) "Was there a final judgment on the merits?" (3) "Was
the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?"'' [Emphasis added.].
The growing number of states3 . and federal courts..' following the
Bernhard decision reason that one fair day in court satisfies due process
requirements,"2 that such a policy is helpful in alleviating the ever increas-
ing problems of crowded dockets,' and that a more liberal policy regard-
ing mutuality aids in preventing the anomalous results on conflicting
determinations on identical issues.'
The most persuasive criticism of the Bernhard decision is that its appli-
cation should be restricted to defensive pleadings. 3' Any other position, it
is suggested, could lead to absurd results, e.g., should a plaintiff be
allowed to plead a single prior adjudication as conclusively establishing a
defendant airline's negligence when in numerous previous actions in
multi-district litigation the defendant has prevailed on the identical issues
of liability?" Mutuality, then, should be required when collateral estoppel
121 Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1942). 1B, J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 5 0.412(1) (2d ed. 1965).
22.19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
12'Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 809, 122 P.2d 892, 894-5 (1942).
"' United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom.,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Gorski v. Commercial
Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio
1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); People v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 474 (10th
Cir. 1956); United Banana Co., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580 (D. Conn. 1959); Bar-
bour v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 143 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. I11. 1956); Woodcock v. Udell, 97
A.2d 878 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364
(1955); De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.,
1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956); Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249
N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958); Harding v. Carr, 79 R.I. 32, 83 A.2d 79 (1951).
... Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Glidden
Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); Haddad v. Border Express, Inc., 300 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1962);
Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1959); State of Colo. v. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co., 232 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1956); Gibson v. United States, 211 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1954);
Hurley v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 183 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1950).
.. Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961); But see 1B J. MooRu,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.412(1) 1809 (2d ed. 1965); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260,
263 (Super. Ct. Del. 1934).
".. Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967).
"' Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 IARV. L. REv. 818 (1952).
5 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
28 (1957).
1"6 id.
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is asserted against a party lacking the initiative in the prior adjudication. 37
A number of jurisdictions38 recognize the fact that due process prob-
lems arising from an abandonment of the mutuality requirement cannot
be summarily discarded and that the reason underlying the more liberal
policy toward mutuality is one of the party against whom the doctrine is
asserted having, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 9 These
courts consider all of the circumstances of each case in order to ascertain
whether the parties have had their full and fair day in court. " A sympa-
thetic jury, for example, without realizing the effect of its judgment on
later valid claims against the defendant, might return a verdict against
a wealthy corporate defendant based solely on the comparative wealth of
the plaintiff and defendant and not on actual issues of liability. 4' An appli-
cation of the doctrine to inherently unfair conditions would clearly consti-
tute infringement upon due process requirements of fundamental fair-
143
ness.
[N]o constitutional right is violated where the thing to be litigated was
actually litigated in a previous suit, final judgment entered, and the party
against whom the doctrine is to be invoked had full opportunity to litigate
the matter and actually did litigate it [Emphasis by the Court.].
A case in point in which fundamental fairness required that mutuality
exist in order for collateral estoppel to be asserted is Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd.'" In Berner, after prevailing in the
initial trial, BCPA suffered a relatively small judgment on retrial. Rea-
soning that BCPA did not appeal from the retrial judgment for danger of
suffering a substantial judgment on appeal, the court held the prior liti-
gation was to be viewed as a settlement and not as an admission of liabil-
ity. Since the prior adjudication was not intended as full and complete
litigation as to the issues of liability, mutuality was required for the
assertion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel."
A recent case, Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc.,' supports the propo-
sition that the need for transfer may be avoided by the use of collateral
estoppel once the issues of liability have been determined by a federal
district court. The court in Maryland followed Bernhard and required that
the three questions laid down in that case be answered affirmatively before
collateral estoppel could be asserted. In addition, the court stated a fourth
requirement, this one relating to the issues of fairness: "Was the party
against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on
11 Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 302 (1961).
"'aCurrie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965).
" Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965).
14' United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United
Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 95 (1964).
'
4 Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1928).
"'Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion-Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1963).
1
43 Id. at 725-26; see also, Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
'4346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1965).
141 Cf. Eechnograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969 (Ct. CI. 1967).
148State of Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967). Cf., 34 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 304 (1968).
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the issue?""' Although the court stayed decision on a motion for summary
judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel until completion of appellate
disposition of cases in other district courts arising out of the same acci-
dent, the court held that such motion should be granted in light of judg-
ments of other federal district courts determining that the negligence of
federal employees was the cause of the collision giving rise to the actions.
The court noted that:
[T]here seems to be no compelling reasons for requiring that the party
asserting the plea of collateral estoppel, even affirmatively as in this case, must
have been a party or in privity with a party to the earlier litigation
[Emphasis added.],"
Reflective of many of the same considerations discussed above, the
court concluded:
[I]n view of the crowded dockets of the courts today, ancient principles must
give way to principles based on today's realities so long as these new princi-
ples do not deprive a litigant of his day in court."'
It would seem then that the simplicity of the wording of 1404 (a)
belies the complexity of its application. The decision in a federal transfer
proceeding is based on numerous factors varying with the circumstances
and supposition or generalization in this area of federal procedure is
necessarily dangerous. The unpredictability of the application of the
statute limits its utility as a vehicle for solving the problems presented by
multi-district litigation. The recent search for a more effective remedy
has encompassed both case law (collateral estoppel) and statutory enact-
ment (the MLA). These remedies are new and their adequacy untested.
They do, however, mirror the fact that the problems are recognized and
the foundation for an adequate solution has been laid.
147 Id. at 304.
.
4
.State of Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298, 303 (D. Md. 1967).
14 1d. at 304.
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NOTES
Warsaw Convention - Limited Liability - Voyage Charter
On 3 June 1962, a chartered Air France Boeing 707 jet liner crashed
on takeoff at Orly Field, Paris, France, killing all 122 passengers aboard.
The aircraft had been chartered by the Atlanta Art Association, acting
as agent for its members making the round trip from Atlanta to Paris.
Under the terms of the Charter Agreement, Air France, owner of the craft,
assumed all responsibility and control over the actual preparation and
conduct of the flight. It issued and delivered proper tickets to its passen-
gers prior to departure. The only responsibility of the Atlanta Art Asso-
ciation under the agreement was to render payment of $36,000 to Air
France. Forty-five actions for damages filed against Air France for the
deaths of 62 passengers were consolidated. The district court heard the
limited question of whether the Warsaw Convention applied to the type
of charter flight involved in this case and concluded that it did. From
this decision appeal was taken. Held, affirmed: "The Warsaw Convention
applies to the international transportation of passengers under a contract
of carriage on a 'voyage' charter flight [Emphasis added.]."' Block v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964),
aff'd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 382 U.S. 905 (1968).
The Warsaw Convention was designed to regulate the legal relationship
between a passenger who suffers injury to himself or his baggage during
an international flight, and a carrier. The underlying purpose behind the
drafting of the Convention was to avoid the complex legal issues which
are inherent in any law suit involving various foreign jurisdictions. One
authority has stated:
The purposes of the Convention are to avoid difficulties of the application
of a proper law. In some countries . . . the carrier is responsible for injury
to passenger or damage to goods as an insurer. In other countries . .. the
carrier is not responsible unless fault is shown. Also, the burden of proof
differs in various countries. Some impose the burden on the plaintiff and
some on the carrier. Furthermore, the contractual exemption of liability is
permitted in some and not in others. When the various and conflicting laws
are coupled with the fact that modern aircraft pass over in the span of an
hour, one or more countries, the fortuitous circumstances of crashing in any
one country, imposes a burden upon the passenger which may be so intolerable
as to preclude any recovery. Furthermore, difficulties of application of foreign
law, characterization of foreign law, problems of acquisition of jurisdiction,
application of damages, all may make it so difficult that the passenger might
find it impossible to recover at all .... Under the Convention the rights and
liabilities do not depend upon a particular national law where the tort occurs
1 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1967).
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or where the particular contract is made but are dependent upon a uniform
system of rules.'
In response to these problems, the Convention holds the carrier pre-
sumptively liable for any injury to a passenger during an international
flight.' In return for the presumption of liability the passenger is limited
in his recovery to a maximum of approximately $8300.' The presumption
of liability can be rebutted by proof that the carrier took all necessary
steps to avoid injury.' Conversely, the carrier is denied the benefit of
limited liability if the passenger can prove wilfull misconduct on the part
of the carrier.' Further, the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket to the
passenger in order to avail itself of the limited liability provisions in the
Convention.'
The application of the Warsaw Convention to a particular case is de-
pendent upon the existence of a contract of carriage between the carrier
and the passengers' which establishes that the transportation contemplated
by the parties is "international" as that term is defined by the Convention.'
On its face, the Convention would seem to apply only to a two party rela-
tionship evidenced by the appropriate contractual instrument, the airline
ticket. The problem of bringing three party charter flights within the rules
of liability established by the Convention becomes, then, a serious one.
Whether the scope of the Warsaw Convention excludes charter flights de-
pends upon the answer to three questions: (1) Does the legislative history
of the Warsaw Convention manifest an intent to exclude all charter
flights from coverage by the Convention; (2) To which carrier, the owner
of the craft or the actual operator, does the Convention impose the risk of
liability; and (3) Does the particular charter contract executed by the
parties qualify as a contract of carriage?
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention states that the rules of liability
established therein shall apply "to all international transportation . . .
performed by aircraft for hire."1 The expansive language of this article
is limited by three specific exclusions made within the Convention. First,
the Convention shall not apply "to carriage of mail and postal packages.""
2 Mennell & Simeone, U.S. Policy and the Warsaw Convention, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 219, 223
(1962).
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 29 Oct. 1934, 49 Star. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (concluded at Warsaw, Poland, 12 Oct. 1929).
Articles 17-21 contain the rules governing the liability of the carrier. [Hereinafter cited Warsaw
Convention.)
'Under the Warsaw Convention Liability Agreement, Civil Aeronautics Board Order No.
E-23680, 13 May 1966, the liability limits of Warsaw were increased to $75,000, absolute liability,
based on a private agreement between carrier and passenger. However, the present case arose before
the Montreal Agreement was signed, and is therefore still subject to the original Warsaw limits.
'Warsaw Convention, art. 20, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
6Warsaw Convention, art. 25, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
'Warsaw Convention, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876.
8
J. SUNDBERG, AIR CHARTER 198-99 (1961).
a Warsaw Convention, art. 1 (2), 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
10Warsaw Convention, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
" Warsaw Convention, art. 2(2), 49 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876.
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Second, the Convention shall not apply "to international transportation by
air performed by way of experimental trial by air navigation."1' Finally,
the Convention shall not apply "to transportation performed in extra-
ordinary circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier'slbusi-
ness." Of the three exceptions, only the last possibly includes air charter
flights, and, by 1962, there was little controversy that air charter flights
were no longer by definition an "extraordinary circumstance."'" In addi-
tion, the Hague Protocol," an amendment to the original text of the War-
saw Convention, "provides that as to cases properly fitting under Article
34, [the extraordinary circumstances exclusion] it is not the whole of the
Convention that is.excluded but only Articles 3 to 9 of the documentary
chapter."'" Therefore, even in the event charter flights were defined as
extraordinary circumstances, they are still entitled to limited liability pro-
tection, if the other requirements of the Warsaw Convention are met.
The only attempt made by the Warsaw Convention delegates to deter-
mine whether air charter would be included was the Brazilian proposal
for the definition of the word "carrier" which reads as follows:
The carrier shall be considered the person who owns, charters, or manages an
aircraft, uses it individually or jointly in the transportation of persons and
goods, within the meaning of this Convention and in conformity with the
national regulations."
The Warsaw Conference rejected that proposed definition, 1 and from this
rejection has come the diversity of opinion over air charter. Some scholars
maintain that the question of charter flights was left undecided;" others
asserted that the question of air charter was not considered at the Warsaw
Conference since the "Convention was to be a codification of the law of
aviation as aviation until then had developed."" It is essential to note,
however, that while the Brazilian proposal would have defined a carrier's
relationship to the aircraft, it would not have settled the issue of the rela-
tionship between the carrier and the passenger."
The debate between the legal scholars on this question became more
heated because of the difficulties in translating the original French text of
the Convention into other languages. In 1961, the Guadalajara Conference
convened in Mexico to settle the long controversy over charter flights by
defining essential terms in the Warsaw Convention. The full title of the
Guadalajara Convention" expressly noted that this Convention would be
"Warsaw Convention, art. 34, 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876.
Is Id.
14J. SUNDBERG, supra note 8, at 262.
" Protocol Amending Carriage by Air, The Hague, 28 Sept. 1955. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 86TH CONG., lIsT SESS. The United States has never ratified the Hague
Protocol.
" J. SUNDBERG, supra note 8, at 263.
'7386 F.2d at 340, n.43. Mankiewicz, Charter and Interchange of Aircraft and the Warsaw
Convention: A Study of Problems Arising From the National Application of Conventions for the
Unification of Private Law, 10 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 707 (1961) at n.3.
Is Mankiewicz, supra note 17, at 707.
19K. GRONFORs, AIR CHARTER AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 11 (1956).
2J. SUNDBERG, supra note 8, at 199-200. .
21 Mankiewicz, supra note 17.
"For the full text of the Guadalajara Convention see 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 52 (1962).
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a supplement and not an amendment to the original Warsaw text." The
implication of the title is that the Guadalajara Convention merely defines
the Warsaw Convention and does not in any way amend the contents of
Warsaw. It can be argued, therefore, that the delegates at the Guadalajara
Conference considered charter flights as within the original scope of the
Warsaw Convention. 4
II. THE WARSAW CARRIER
The typical air charter arrangement is a triangle: A will charter a plane
from B for the purpose of providing transportation for C, in accordance
with a contract between A and C. If C is an international passenger and
is subsequently injured, the Warsaw Convention must be interpreted to
determine which carrier, A or B, will bear the risk of liability under the
rules of the Convention.
In Articles 1 (3) and 30 (1) the Warsaw Convention refers to carriage
"performed by" the carrier-the obvious reference being to the actual
carrier. However, the general framework of the Convention is apparently
predicated upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the
passenger and the carrier.' Where the actual carrier is not the party to a
contract with the passenger, as in charter arrangements, the question arises
whether the nature of the carrier liability necessarily contemplated by
the Convention is contractual or tort.
As a point of departure, it must be noted that the Warsaw Convention's
official text is in French.' The Convention was sponsored and promoted by
Frenchmen. The influence of French law on the substantive provisions of
the Convention was substantial. The instant court, recognizing the impact
of French law on the Convention, interpreted the relevant provisions in
terms of the dominant influence on its contents and applied French law.2
Prior to 1911, the French law of passenger carriage had been based on
tort liability. Subsequently, the basis of liability shifted and had become
contractual in nature by the time the Convention was drafted.' The
obvious conclusion is that the nature of carrier liability embodied in the
Warsaw Convention is contractual," which is borne out by a reading of
2 The full title for the Guadalajara Convention is, Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw
Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the International Carriage by Air
Performed by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier. For a study of the scope of application
of the Guadalajara Convention, and how it relates to the Warsaw Convention, see Koutalidis, The
New Guadalajara Convention, 16 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 285 (1963).
24 The jurisdiction of the Guadalajara Convention is apparently derived from the jurisdiction of
the Warsaw Convention or its amended version, The Hague Protocol. For a discussion, see Kou-
talidis, supra note 23, at 287.
2 j. SUNDBERG, supra note 8, at 244 et. seq. See also Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the
Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 217 (1959).
15Warsaw Convention, art. 36, 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876.
" J. SUNDBERO, supra note 8, at 244 et. seq. Calkins, supra note 25, at 339. There is an im-
portant conflicts question as to whether Georgia or French law should govern in the instant case.
The court applies French law without a discussion of the conflicts issue. Under the Auten v. Auten,
124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1950), test of substantial contacts, however, the court's decision
to apply French law can be defended. One party to the contract was French, the crash occurred in
France, and the carrier was French.
"s Calkins, supkra note 25, at 219; J. SUNDBERG, sujsra note 8, at 324 et. seq.29Mankiewicz, supra note 17, at 709-10.
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the Convention in its entirety. ° The result of such a construction is that
an actual carrier, under no privity of contract with a passenger, is left
without the limited liability protection afforded the contractual carrier.
Consequently, the passenger must file a tort claim against the actual
carrier, and the carrier's liability is determined according to the local law
found applicable by the forum. This reliance on diverse local laws of the
international community would defeat the underlying purpose of the
Convention which is to promote uniformity in international air carriage.
A realization of the magnitude of the problem gradually led to a con-
sensus that a new Convention was needed to settle the legal problems
involved in charter flights. Committees of International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) " met from 1955 to 1957, to discuss the problems,
and a convention was finally proposed and drafted at Guadalajara, Mexico,
in 1961." As noted above, the Guadalajara Convention is a supplement to
the Warsaw Convention (defined as either the unamended Warsaw Con-
vention or its amended version at the Hague)." The Guadalajara Conven-
tion consists mainly of definitions, and defines actual and contractual
carriers, imposing joint and several liability for damages in certain
instances.34
III. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
Application of the Warsaw Convention is dependent upon the existence
of a contract of carriage between the carrier and the international passen-
ger. Under French law, a contract must contain four elements:" (1) con-
sent of the party who binds himself, (2) his capacity to contract, (3) a
special object forming the substance of the agreement, and (4) a legal
cause for the obligation. A contract of carriage, as a particular type of
contract, requires the additional element of an obligation to transport
goods or passengers.' A charter contract, to come within the terms of the
Convention, must be a contract of carriage.
The particular form and nature of a charter agreement will depend
upon the charter arrangement made between the parties, of which there
are two basic types: (1) voyage charter, involving the hire of a fully
equipped aircraft, where the charterer acquires the "right to have his goods
or passengers conveyed by a particular vessel, and subsidiary thereto, to
have the use of the vessel and the services of the owner's master and
crew;"" and (2) bare hull charter, "a demise or lease of the ship itself,
to which the services of the master and the crew may or may not be super-
3 0 Warsaw Convention, arts. 17-20, 49 Stat. 3018, T.S. No. 876; Mankiewicz, supra note 17,
at 709-10.
3' ICAO was formed in 1947 to replace the Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (CITEJA)
which up to that time had been the conference responsible for the drafting of the Warsaw Con-
vention.
3' Koutalidis, supra note 23, at 285.
" See supra note 27.
" The actual carrier can be held responsible only for that part of the carriage which he per-
forms, however. Guadalajara Convention, art. 2.
' These elements are the ones enumerated by the court in its opinion, 386 F.2d at 323, n.21.36 K. Gronfors, supra note 19, at 60.
"
7 A. McNAI, TErn LAW OF THE AIR 372 (3d rev. ed. .1964).
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added, with the result that 'the charterer' here [becomes] the owner of the
vessel." ' Charter arrangements are seldom purely one form or the other
of these types, and several hybrid categories of charter arrangements do
exist. 9 The following discussion is offered upon the understanding that
each charter contract must itself be measured against the Warsaw require-
ments.
While the contract of carriage contemplated by the Convention repre-
sents primarily a "sale and purchase of transportation of persons or
goods,""0 the voyage charter contract represents the "sale and purchase of
moving space.""5 In contrast to both, the bare hull charter represents the
hiring of an aircraft for use by the charterer, subject to certain conditions
imposed in the contract." Underlying both the contract of carriage and the
voyage charter agreements is an obligation to carry passengers or goods,
whereas the bare hull charter more closely resembles a lease. Under French
law, "leases and contracts of carriage are contrasting and mutually exclu-
sive terms. Accordingly, what is a lease cannot be a contract of carriage.""
With the contract of carriage as its starting point, the Convention
enumerates several additional requirements which must be met before a
contract will satisfy the Warsaw standards. The carrier is required to issue
passenger tickets, luggage tickets, and air consignment notes." The carrier
may not avail itself of the limitation of liability contained in Warsaw
unless it delivers the required ticket containing the following information:
place and date of issue, name and address of carrier (s), a statement noting
that the transportation is subject to the rules of the Convention, and the
place of departure and destination including agreed stopping places. ' The
essential importance of the ticket is that with the proper recitation of
points of departure and arrival and agreed stopping places, it serves to
bring the particular transportation described thereon within the geographi-
cal qualifications of Warsaw applicability, as "international transporta-
tion." Although all of these requirements can be fulfilled under a voyage
charter agreement, it would be impossible to meet them under a bare hull
arrangement, where the charterer, during the period of the use of the air-
craft, becomes the owner and operator of the craft himself. Further, in a
bare hull charter agreement, no specific predetermined voyage must be
agreed upon. The agreement upon and consent to the voyage is the essence
of the obligation to transport passengers or baggage which underlies both
voyage charter agreements and contracts of carriage.
IV. THE PRESENT CASE
As noted above, the present case was a voyage charter flight, and the
court limited itself to a consideration of this kind of charter arrangement.
8 Id. at 372.
" C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW § 509 (1945) lists four types of air charter.
40 K. GRONFORS, supra note 19, at 60.
41 id.
42 Id.
43 j. SUNDBERG, supra note 8, at 271 eq. seq.
" Warsaw Convention, arts. 3(1), 5(1), and 6(3-5), 49 Stat. 3015-16, T.S. No. 876.
"Warsaw Conventioin, art. 3(1), 49 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876.
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Appellants maintained that all charter flights were denied protection of
the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention," and that the requisite
contractual relationship between the carrier and passengers did not exist.
"Not only must there be a contract, but Article 1 (2) requires 'the con-
tract made by the parties.' 'Parties' is not defined. Who are the 'parties'?
The only 'parties' mentioned are the carrier and the passenger. . . .A
charter contract obviously is not 'the contract made by the parties' within
the compass of the Warsaw Convention.. . .""' Appellee denied on the basis
of the legislative history of the Convention' that all charter flights are
per se excluded from the Warsaw Convention and contended that those
charter flights evidenced by a contract of carriage are within the scope of
the Convention. He further contended that the requirement of a direct
contractual relationship between the parties was overruled in Ross v. Pan
American Airways."' Finally, appellee asserted that the Charter Agreement
was a proper contract of carriage, disclosing the intent of the parties that
Warsaw would apply, since, on its face, each ticket proved the flight was
engaged in "international transportation."" °
In agreeing with appellee's contentions, the court followed recent federal
patterns in American law on charter flights. Previously, two federal
appellate courts had applied Warsaw to military charter flights. In Mertens
v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 1 a plane chartered to carry soldiers from Cali-
fornia to Japan crashed in Japan. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that this flight did not come within the reservation" that flights
operated by the United States Government would not come within the
Warsaw Convention, and concluded that the craft was operated for, not
by, the United States Government. The court stated, "The unavoidable
conclusion is that the Warsaw Convention, as it is presently binding on
the United States, is applicable to the flight in this suit."" A second military
charter flight case, Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,54 apparently assumed
that the Warsaw Convention applies to charter flights because the court
held the carrier was not entitled to limited liability since it did not deliver
tickets to its passengers in advance."
Noticeably absent from the court's opinion in the instant case was any
mention of the Guadalajara Convention and the provisions contained
therein. This Convention imposes joint and several liability on both the
actual and contractual carriers and thus brings charter flights within the
scope of Warsaw. It would seem that the legislative history of this Con-
" Brief for Appellants at 10, Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.
1967).47 1d. at 108-09.
" Brief for Appellee at 23 et. seq., Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1967).
49299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
5"Brief for Appellee, supra note 48, at 37, n.44.
5"341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
"When the United States ratified the Warsaw Convention, it did so with the reservation that
all flights conducted by the United States Government would not be subject to the provisions of
the Convention.
"3 341 F.2d at 854.
54 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
"Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. 8c COM. 385 (1967).
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vention could help explain the confusion that presently exists regarding
the scope of the Warsaw Convention. For that reason no discussion of the
legislative history of the Warsaw Convention can be complete without
recognition of the purposes and accomplishments of the Guadalajara
Convention, despite the fact that the United States has not ratified this
Convention.
The court's opinion also devoted considerable attention to the con-
tractual arguments of the appellants, concluding that voyage charters can
be contracts of carriage. In its discussion, the court assumed that the French
law on contracts determines the Warsaw concept of a contract of carriage
and ignored a substantial conflicts of laws question as to whether French
or Georgia law should determine the applicability of the Convention.
While the court's reliance on French law might have been appropriate
because the parties had substantial contracts with the French forum, the
court has oversimplified the very complex issue of treaty interpretation.
Relying on French contract law, the court recognized that a contract
of carriage must assume an obligation to transport passengers or goods,
stating:
The applicability of the Convention undeniably is premised upon a contract
but on a contract of a particular kind. It is based on a contract of carriage
that arises from the relationship between a "carrier" and the passengers. This
contractual relationship requires only that the carrier consent to undertake
the international transportation of the passenger from one designated spot to
another, and that the passenger in turn consent to the undertaking [Foot-
notes omitted.]."e
The present decision is a proper one if the viability of the Warsaw
Convention is to be maintained. The major objective of the Convention
was to promote uniformity in the regulation of international air carriage.
Such uniformity cannot be obtained unless all important aspects of air
carriage are brought within liability rules established by the Convention.
Although the present case is limited to only voyage charter flights, it will
help to settle the controversy centering around charter flights, and will
ultimately promote the objectives of the Warsaw Convention.
Linda A. Whitley
5' 386 F.2d at 330.
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Conflict of Law- Maritime Tort -
Significant Contact Theory
Decedent, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, purchased a round-trip ticket to
Boston from Northeast Airlines in Pennsylvania. On 3 October 1960, in
the course of taking off from Boston Logan Airport, the Eastern Air Lines
Lockheed Electra' crashed into navigable waters of Massachusetts, resulting
in plaintiff's death. The administrator of his estate brought an action in
assumpsit on the "law side" of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizen-
ship. Desiring recovery under Pennsylvania's Survival Statute' and Wrong-
ful Death Statute,' the plaintiff alleged that the fatal injuries were the
result of "negligence, breach of warranty, and breach of contract" on the
part of Eastern.4 The District Court held that the negligence of Eastern
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's death and that Pennsylvania law,
the law of the forum, controlled the question of recoverable damages. The
defendant appealed the question of damages to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit Held, affirmed: An action for wrongful
death of a Pennsylvania domiciliary occurring in the navigable waters of
Massachusetts may be adjudicated under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death
Statute, on diversity jurisdiction, as an action for negligent breach of
contract of carriage imposed upon the carrier by Pennsylvania law, without
"abdication of federal authority over maritime torts." Moreover, the
court in dictum stated that, when an action is adjudicated according to
maritime law, a state's wrongful death statute may be applied to the
maritime tort occurring in the territorial water of another state if the
former state has the most significant contact with the parties and issues
involved. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968).
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF SUIT
A. Federal And State Law
Historically, the crash of an airplane in the navigable waters of a state
causing fatal injuries was cognizable as a maritime right of action sounding
' Eastern Air Lines is a Delaware corporation which does business in various states, including
Pennsylvania.
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950) allows recovery equal to the descendent's probable
earnings during the period of his life expectancy.
aPA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1957) provides in part: "Whenever death shall be occasioned
by unlawful violence or negligence, . . . the widow of the deceased, or if -there be no widow, the
personal representatives may maintain an action for and rcover damages for the death thus oc-
casioned."
"Plaintiff dropped his breach of warranty theory before the case came to trial.
5 The present opinion is the rehearing of the court en-banc. For the previous opinion in which
the court reversed and remanded the issue of damages, see Scott v Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 10 Av.
Cas. 17,179 (3d Cir. 1968). (Not officially' reported.)
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in tort' which ordinarily would be adjudicated according to federal law.'
As an alternative to the directive that all maritime actions are federal," a
state retains certain common law rights of action apart from federal
maritime rights of action! If the common law right of action is pursued
in a federal court on diversity jurisdiction, the court would be bound by
the rules laid down in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins'" and Klaxon v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc." Accordingly, the court, sitting as another court of
the state, would have to apply the substantive law of the state in which
it sits. However, in determining whether a suit is properly characterized
as a maritime action or as a state common law action, a federal court has
no duty of deference to a state's view.'2 This reasoning originated in
Sampson v. Channell s where a federal appellate court, entertaining a
diversity case, was confronted with the question of whether state law or
federal law governed the issue of the burden of proof in contributory
negligence. In characterizing the issue as a substantive matter according
to federal law, the court held that "classification by the state court for
one purpose does not mean that the classification is valid for another
purpose. Surely, the question whether a particular subject-matter falls
within the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of procedure
. . . or is a matter of substantive law governed by the Tompkins case,
cannot be foreclosed by the label given to the subject-matter by the state
courts."" Nevertheless, a federal court may consider the state's characteri-
zation in arriving at its own characterization of the suit.
Pennsylvania law, the law of the forum in the present case, invokes the
legal fiction of classifying a suit as a negligent breach of contract even
though tort principles of negligence control the action.'" Common law
afforded a similar procedural stratagem of waiving the tort and suing in
assumpsit. According to the court in Quaker Worsted Mills Corp. v. How-
ard Trucking Corp.,'" Pennsylvania law imposes liability upon common car-
a If fatal injuries are sustained in navigable waters, tort claims for those injuries are maritime
in nature, see, e.g., Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, 316 F.2d 758, 766 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963), whether the proceeding is instituted in admiralty or on the "law side" of the
court. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Massaro v. United States Lines Co.,
307 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1962); J. B. Effenson Co. v. Three Bays Corp., 238 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.
1956). See also Note, 32 George Wash. L.J. 635 (1963) for a discussion of the test applied in de-
termining whether a tort or contract is governed by maritime law.
7See notes 37-79, infra, and accompanying text.
s See note 38, infra.
'See "Saving Clause," 28 U.S.C. S 1333 (1964).
0 304 U.S. 67, 74-77 (1938). See also, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108, reb.
denied, 326 U.S. 806 (1945).
" 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). The principle question was whether, in diversity cases, federal
courts must follow conflicts of law rules prevailing in the states in which they sit. The Supreme
Court held "that the prohiibtion declared in Erie . . . against such independent determinations by
the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws." See also, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 n.36
(1957).
", Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 757-58 (1st Cir. 1940).
'a Id.
14 id.
" As noted by Chief Justice Hastie, dissenting in the instant case, Pennsylvania law invoking
this legal fiction is neither "persuasive" nor "authoritive" in permitting the court to classify the
Suit as a negligent breach of contract. 399 F.2d at 33.18 131 Pa. Super. 1, 7, 198 A. 691, 694-95 (1938). See also, Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Robinson Elec. Co., Inc. v. Capitol Trucking Corp., 168 Pa. Super.
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riers, and common carriers impliedly promise to exercise the highest degree
of care. If the common carrier fails to exercise the degree of care "not bar-
gained for by the respective parties [but] . . .imposed upon him by law,"
an action in assumpsit or trespass will lie for the breach." Further, if failure
to exercise this degree of care results in death, an action can be brought for
the negligent breach of contract under Pennsylvania's Survival and
Wrongful Death Statutes."' Where such an action involves a dispute over
the choice of laws, Pennsylvania law, as espoused in Griffith v. United Air
Lines,"' demands application of the significant contacts theory instead of
the lex loci delicti theory. Pennsylvania's choice of laws rule requires the
court to analyze the interests of the states in determining which state's
law applies to the legal issue in conflict."
B. Injection Of The Scott Decision
By application of the rule of law in the Sampson case to the instant case,
the federal court would not have beeen bound by Pennsylvania's char-
acterization of the action. However, notwithstanding the maritime nature
of the action,2 ' the court reviewed both state and federal law, and char-
acterized the action as Pennsylvania would have, that is, as a suit for negli-
gent breach of contract of carriage." Presumably, the deference to the
state's view was due to some apprehension that federal maritime law would
limit the amount of recoverable damages to the sum allowed under Mass-
achusetts' Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes."
Relying basically on Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines," a case that arose
430, 433, 79 A.2d 123, 125 (1951); Daugherty v. Main Transp. Co., 141 Me. 124, 129, 39 A.2d
758, 759 (1944).
"7Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Nuside Metal Products, Inc.
v. Eazor Express, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 593, 152 A.2d 275, 279 (1959); Robinson Elec. Co., Inc.
v. Capitol Trucking Corp., 168 Pa. Super. 430, 433, 79 A.2d 123, 125 (1951); Eckert v. Penn.
R.R., 211 Pa. 267, 60 A. 781 (1905).
" Although Pennsylvania had precedent for an action in negligent breach of contract of car-
riage as applied to its Survival Statute [Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964)], it had no authority for such an action as applied to its Wrongful Death Statute. Never-
theless, the instant court held that "the negligent breach sufficient to satisfy the Survival Act is
also sufficient to satisfy the Wrongful Death Act." 399 F.2d at 23. However, in Di Belardin
v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 585, 208 A.2d 283, 285-86 (1965), as followed in Miller
v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 386-87, 221 A.2d 320, 322 (1966), the Pennsylvania court, adjudicating
an action for breach of warranty under the Wrongful Death Statute, held "that the right of action
provided by the 'Wrongful Death' statute could be brought only in trespass and that, therefore,
an action in assumpsit for breach of warranty was inappropriate" [Emphasis added.]. Since negli-
gence was neither pleaded nor proved in Di Belardino and Miller, the instant court held that, recog-
nizing them as authority in the present situation, would "amount to a repudiation of the progressive
policies espoused in Griffith .... " 399 F.2d at 24.
1" 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). See also, Bauer, Conflict of laws-Lex Loci Delicti-Sig-
nificant Contact Theory, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 275 (1965).
"0McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 94, 215 A,2d 677, 682 (1966); Griffith v. United Air
Lines, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
as Note, 6-7, supra and cases cited therein.
22 Chief Justice Hastie in his dissent, reasoned that, "when, in the course of litigation in a
federal court, it becomes necessary to determine whether the wrong in suit is a maritime tort or
a breach of contract, the federal court must decide for itself what characterization is proper, with-
out any duty of deference to any state view." 399 F.2d at 33.
23MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 228, § 1(2) (1957), & ch. 229 (1949) as amended (Supp. 1962).
Massachusetts' Survival Statute limits the amount of recovery to $20,000. However, Pennsylvania's
Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1957) & tit. 20,
320.603 (1950), do not limit recovery.
24316 F.2d 758 (1963).
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out of the same crash, the present court reasoned that the action for negli-
gent breach of contract of carriage was properly characterized since the
action was not in conflict with maritime law." In Weinstein, this same
court, entertaining an action on admiralty jurisdiction, adjudicated claims
involving a maritime tort, breach of contract, and breach of warranty.
Not only did the court rule that the tort action was governed by mari-
time law, but it held:
[A] contract or warranty relating to the airframe or power plant of a land-
based aircraft and a contract of carriage by air between two cities on the
United States mainland are not maritime in substance, nor are . . . [they]
made maritime by virtue of the fact that the aircraft . . . flew briefly over
navigable waters [of a state] ....
In sum, the court in Weinstein drew a distinction between actions for the
simple breach of contract that could be entertained on admiralty juris-
diction, and those that could not be brought on admiralty jurisdiction.
Since the principles for simple breach of contract did not control the
present case," it is questionable that Weinstein governs the issue of whether
or not an action for a negligent breach of contract is a proper characteri-
zation for a suit arising out of a crash in the navigable waters of a state.
Moreover, Pennsylvania's law of invoking the legal fiction of waiving the
tort and suing in assumpsit is neither persuasive nor authoritative in per-
mitting a federal court to characterize this suit as a negligent breach of
contract."8 The legal fiction relies on enactment of laws imposing liability
as a term in every contract, regardless of whether the parties to the con-
tract intended to incorporate the liability into the contract." Such impo-
sition of liability appears to be an exertion of "force" and repugnant to
contract law; any term in a contract procured through force is not
enforceable.'
The majority avoided this line of reasoning by referring to Pennsylvania
law. Justifying its characterization of the action as a negligent breach of
"See "Saving Clause," 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964); Justice v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 389
(1941); Norton, Assignee v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356 (1876); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall
522, 533 (1872); Perry v. Stanfield, 278 Mass. 563, 180 N.E. 514, 515 (1932). For constitutional
rejections of applying state law derogatory to maritime law, see, Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co.,
247 U.S. 372 (1918). The instant court held "that recognition of the diversity claim for breach
of contract of nonnegligent carriage can in no sense be construed as an abdication of federal
authority over maritime torts." 399 F.2d at 22.
'6316 F.2d at 766.
"The instant court relied on Griffith, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that "[t]he principles which will govern defendant's liability are principles of
negligence, not of contract, since the action is for negligent breach, not simple breach, of contract."
Moreover, the court held that [m]ere technicalities of pleading should not blind us to the true
nature of the action." 203 A.2d at 800.
28 Note 15, supra.
"See, S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 615 (3d ed. 1938). Williston suggests the standard that
should be applied in determining whether a compulsory statute is adopted into the terms of a con-
tract, since "it is a dangerous thing to read too many things into a contract that are not placed
in the contract by the parties to it." Leiendecker v. Etna Indemnity Co., 52 Wash. 609, 611, 101
P. 219 (1909) (dictum); contra, e.g., Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 117 N.E. 185 (1917).
These cases deal with statutes regulating contracts (in this case an insurance contract), and not
with imposition of liability to avoid injury to another.
"Davidson v. Payne, 281 F. 544, 546 (C.C.D.K.), aff'd, 289 F. 69 (8th Cir. 1923). See, Note,
21 MICH. L. REv. 449 (1922), and cases cited therein for discussion of optional vs. compulsory
statutes.
[Vol. 34
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
contract under Pennsylvania law, the court followed Erie and Klaxon.
Making no distinction between goods and passengers," the court concluded
that the airline, like the common carrier of goods, impliedly promises to
carry its passengers in a non-negligent manner, and is liable in assumpsit
for breach of the degree of care imposed upon him by Pennsylvania law."'
Since the state abandoned the lex loci delicti choice of laws theory in favor
of the significant contacts theory," the interests of both states were re-
viewed as to the issue involved-damages. The court held that Pennsyl-
vania had "[d]emonstrated . . . a priority interest in the application of its
choice of law,"'4 and that application of its law was not in conflict with
the Constitution." Although the plaintiff won his action under the "Sav-
ings Clause"" for negligent breach of contract of carriage, the court, in
dictum, ruled on his maritime claim. In adjudicating the action, the court
was faced with the issue of whether maritime law follows significant con-
tacts conflict of law theory or the lex loci delicti theory.
II. MARITIME TORT: Significant Contacts v. Lex Loci Delicti
Maritime law afforded no right of action at common law for wrongful
death occurring in a state's territorial waters. To create a right of action,
admiralty fashioned its own law" by adopting the wrongful death statutes
of the states (and the rights of action created thereunder) to supplement
maritime law.' Although a federal court entertaining a wrongful death
action on admiralty jurisdiction adopts a state's death statute, it is not
bound by the law of the state in which it sits.' Moreover, in Pope & Tal-
bot, Inc. v. Hawn,"' the Supreme Court held that it is immaterial whether
admiralty or diversity jurisdiction is relied upon when the action involves
a" "We cannot perceive . . . any compelling reasons for Pennsylvania to restrict an injured
passenger to an action in trespass while, at the same time, a shipper may elect between trespass
and assumpsit for damage to goods." 203 A.2d at 800.
"' See cases cited at notes 16-17, supra.
3203 A.2d 796 (1964).
34 Pennsylvania's interests include: (1) the place of the wrong, (2) the domicile of the descend-
ent, and (3) the place of administration of the estate. Massachusetts' interest was the place of the
tort. See, Kuchinic v. McCory, 422 Pa. 620, 624, n.4, 222 A.2d 897, 899, n.4 (1966); McSwain v.
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
"See, Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1961); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316-21 (1945), as applied, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-
24 (1957). For state law in conflict with the Constitution, see, First Nat. Bk. of Chicago v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 400 (1952), reh. denied, 343 U.S. 921 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951). See also, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 629 (1964), where the Supreme
Court left open the question of constitutional limitations on the choice of law by state courts.
""Saving Clause," 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
"Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340
(1960); Butler v. Boston and Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 555 (1889); The Harrisburg,
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
"sU.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, extends judicial power "[t]o cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 confers upon Congress the power "to make laws . . . for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers .... " If Congress has not set up statutory guidance
(as in this instance), maritime law, as formed by the federal courts, is the law applicable to mari-
time matters. See, Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
9See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).4
0Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 650-52 (1953). See also, Goett v. Union Carbide Corp.,
361 U.S. 340 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
41 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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a maritime tort." Regardless of the nature of jurisdiction, a maritime action
is "[s]ubject to the dominant control of the Federal Government."' In
other words, the rights of an injured party should not be determined any
differently on the "law side" of the court than they would be determined
on the admiralty side."4 Further, a state court when adjudicating an action
for wrongful death occurring in state territorial waters, must apply federal
maritime law, that is, the state's wrongful death statute and the rights of
action created thereunder.'
This adoption of a state's right of action under its death statute without
simultaneous adoption of the interpretative law thereunder, has aroused
controversy as to the substantive law applicable by a federal court in mari-
time proceedings. In past decisions, courts took the position that applica-
tion of a state's death statute was merely remedial,4 6 and that state substan-
tive law should not be applied in maritime cases.47 Recently, federal courts
have changed their position to that of enforcing the substantive law of the
state under whose statute the action is brought,48 unless the state's law is
in conflict with a right created by maritime law.' In other words, the
courts enforce the cause of action as a whole, limited by the conditions
and terms of the statute." In The Tungus v. Skovgaard,5" the Supreme
Court prescribed the degree to which it would enforce the law of a par-
ticular state. There, the decedent was killed on the deck of a docked ship
in New Jersey territorial waters. His administrator brought a suit under
the wrongful death statute of that state. In the alternative, the admin-
istrator argued that, if the New Jersey statute did not offer a remedy for
wrongful death on a ship, maritime law could be applied so long as the
state had enacted some type of wrongful death statute. The court, rejecting
the alternative argument, gave full effect to the statute of the state." In
extending the doctrine, the Supreme Court in Goett v. Union Carbide
4346 U.S. at 410-11.
43346 U.S. at 410-11, especially n.4 and cases cited therein. See Judge Harlan's opinion in
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). For an interesting contradiction,
see, Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321 (1955), where the Supreme
Court held that, although marine insurance is a federal matter, "[w]e, like Congress, leave the
regulation of marine insurance where it has been-with the States."
"See, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. at 411; Massaro v. United States Lines Co., 307
F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1962); J.B. Effenson Co. v. Three Bays Corp., 238 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1956).45See, e.g., Carlise Packing Co. v. Sandanges, 259 U.S. 255 (1922). In the instant case, Justice
Seitz deduced that the majority opinion overruled cases such as Carlise.46See, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923), and the reasoning
in Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. at 409.
4'Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); cf. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 322-39 (1960) (dissenting
opinion). See also, Sovel, Determining the Applicable Law in Cases Arising in State Territorial
Waters, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 479 (1964).
4SSee, Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588
(1959); The H.S., Inc., 130 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1942).
4 Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
Accord, Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 320 (1960).
"
0
Infra, note 51; Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953).
"'358 U.S. 588 (1959).
"See, Thomas v. United Airlines, 54 Misc.2d 540, 281 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967),
where the state court held that state choice of laws rules rather than federal choice of laws rules
applied. The case was reversed because it extended too far the rule set forth in The Tungus, Id.
Thomas v. United Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. 17,867 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.A.D. 1968) (not officially reported).
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Corp.,"5 held that a state court, adjudicating a maritime action, could
interpret the substantive law applicable to its death statute, or choose to
include "general maritime principles."
Although the law to this point seemed fairly stable, discord ensued
when the Scott decision stated, in dictum, that maritime law permitted
the application of the significant contacts conflict of laws theory over
the lex loci delicti theory. Prior to Scott, Third Circuit courts applied the
wrongful death and survival statute of the state in whose territorial waters
the tort occurred." These courts appear to have adopted the lex loci delicti
choice of laws rule; previous cases, however, dealt only with wrongful
death actions commenced and adjudicated in the state where the maritime
tort took place." In these instances, the court applied the law of the state
in which the person had elected to bring suit (lex fori). Theses courts
were never faced with a choice between competing state statutes, thus
revealing slim authority" for the rule that admiralty courts must apply the
lex loci delicti theory in actions for wrongful death occurring in state
territorial waters. 7
The defendant in Scott contended that The Tungus was precedent for
the rule that federal courts have created a maritime remedy equal to the
statutory death remedy of the state within whose waters the injury
occurred. The court stated that such an interpretation would be in con-
flict with the "clear congressional purpose" revealed by the legislative
history of the Death on the High Seas Act."s When Section 7 of the Senate
Bills' was presented to the House of Representatives, an amendment was
proposed to delete the words, "as to causes of action accruing within the
53361 U.S. 340 (1960).
'5See, United Pilot's Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Hill v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 251
F.2d 655 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 297 (1959); Meehan v. Gulf Oil Corp., 312 F.2d 737
(3d Cir. 1963); Curtis v. A. Garcia Y. Cia, 241 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1957); The H.S., Inc., No. 72,
130 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1942); Klingseisen v. Costanzo Transp. Co., 101 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1939).
55 Id.
" In The H.S., Inc., No. 72, 130 F.2d at 343, this same court held that "he who seeks to
recover in admiralty under a State death statute for a maritime tort may do so only in accordance
with the law of the State in which the tort occurred." Reference to Klingseisen v. Costanzo, 101
F.2d 902, relied upon by the court in H.S., Inc., No. 72, reveals that the holding of the case was
that, when a plaintiff sues in admiralty under a state wrongful death statute, he is bound to the
limitations of the statute. As the instant court held, the "analysis . . . by this court in The H.S.,
Inc., No. 72 is obviously obiter dictum .... "
57 Moreover, as early as 1913 Sixth Circuit courts applied a significant contacts conflicts of laws
theory in Thompson Towing & Wrecking Ass'n v. McGregor, 207 F. 209 (6th Cir. 1913). Pro-
ceedings in admiralty for deaths of crew members of a vessel named the Stewart were adjudicated
under Michigan law. The court held that, although the explosion probably occurred in the Ca-
nadian waters of Lake Huron, the vessel "was through ownership and registration domiciled in
Michigan and was, as respects the enforcement of such a right, part of the territory of Michigan
... [I]n determining the place of Workman's death, we must not overlook the question whether,
in the circumstances of this case, the Stewart was constructively part of Michigan .... " Id. at
216-17. In Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Turner, 269 F. 334 (6th Cir. 1920), a case in-
volving similar circumstances, the court held that when "[g]oing up or down the river, it [the
vessel] would be crossing state lines constantly. It might be difficult, if not impossible, to know
in what state the boat was when some accident on board happened. It would be unfortunate if
the liability of the owner to a seaman for death, or the measure of damages, changed whenever
a state line was crossed." Id. at 343.
5'41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 761-67 (1964). This Act applies only where death occurs outside
the territorial water of any state; see, 59 CONG. REc. 4482-87 (1920), for the legislative history.
59S. 2085, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1920).
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territorial limits of any State."6 Section 7 was presented as follows:
That the provision of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action
or remedies for death shall not be affected by this act as to causes of action
accruing within the territorial limits of any State.6"
The following proposal was made in support of the amendment:
If the amendment which I have suggested should be agreed to, the bill would
not interfere in any way with rights now granted by any State statute,
whether the cause of action accrued within the territorial limits of the State
or not.
6 2
The amendment was passed by the House,6 and later passed by the
Senate.64 It appeared clear that Congress intended to leave with the states
as much power as possible over causes of action for wrongful death regard-
less of where the cause of action arose.6" Therefore, the court held that
The Tungus was concerned with the degree to which maritime law will
apply a state's wrongful death statute and enforce the law under it, and
not as a guide for choosing between competing state statutes.
Finding no binding precedent in support of lex loci delicti and conclud-
ing that Congress did not intend to limit remedies under state law solely
to deaths occurring in a state's territorial waters,"6 the court applied the
significant contacts conflict of laws theory in a manner that it reasoned
the Supreme Court would uphold." The court relied on Lauritzen v.
Larsen,5 where the Supreme Court, after rejecting the lex loci delicti
theory,6" settled on the significant contacts theory as the choice of laws
rule in admiralty cases." In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman, while temporarily
in the United States, joined the crew of a Danish ship and was subsequently
injured in the Havana harbor. He brought suit under the Jones Act 1 in
New York federal district court. On certiorari, the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether Danish or American substantive
law should be applied to the claim. In ruling that Danish law applied, the
Court held:
60 59 CONG. REc. 4484 (1920).
61 Id. at 4482.
6 2 id. at 4484.
63 
Id. at 4486.
6441 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1964).
65358 U.S. at 593. "'The record of the debate in the House of Representatives . . . reflects
deep concern that the power of the States to create actions for wrongful death in no way be
affected by enactment of federal law. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-4486."
6 In the instant case, the court held: -[W]e do not think that Congress contemplated, much
less intended, precluding the application of one state's death act to a maritime tort occurring in
the territorial waters of another state .... " 399 F.2d at 26.
67See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'oench, Duhme. & Co., Inc.
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942). If there is no Congressional ruling or judicial
precedent on a federal question, a federal court can fashion its own rule.
68345 U.S. 571 (1953).
69For support of the lex loci delicti theory, see, 92 A.L.R.2d 1,185, 1,185-90 and cases cited
therein; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, § 391, Comment d, and 5 412.
" For a complete analysis of the pros and cons of the significant contact theory, see, Note,
Conflicts of Laws-Wrongful Death-Significant Contacts vs. Lex Loci, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 114
(1968); Bauer, Conflicts of Laws-Lex Loci Delicti-Significant Contact Theory, 31 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 275 (1965).
"t Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
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Maritime law, like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or resolve con-
flicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact
between the transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws
are involved [Emphasis added.]."'
The significant contacts theory set forth in Lauritzen was subsequently
employed in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,"a where
the court was confronted with claims under general maritime law as well
as claims under the Jones Act. In Romero, a Spanish seaman was injured
while his ship was docked in New York. Although the court noted that in
Lauritzen the injury occurred in foreign waters and that in Romero the
injury occurred in American waters,"4 it held that Spanish law applied
because "[t]he broad principles of choice of law and the applicable criteria
of selection set forth in Lauritzen were intended to guide courts in the
application of maritime law generally.""5
The instant court applied a choice of law rule similar to the significant
contact theory in force in Pennsylvania."0 Chief Justice Hastie, in dissent,
argued that the rule would create non-uniformity." However, the majority
stated that a court sitting in admiralty has an obligation to apply the law
that is most appropriate and equitable notwithstanding a simple, rigid,
and often inequitable rule. Maritime law has exhibited a capacity for
growth and should not be exempt from applying a more equitable rule."
Not only have federal courts applied the significant contacts theory in
certain situations," but a growing number of states have abandoned the
lex loci delicti theory in favor of the significant contacts theory. 0
III. CONCLUSION
In ruling that a wrongful death action, arising from a plane crash
occurring in a state's territorial waters, could be adjudicated on diversity
12 345 U.S. at 582.
73358 U.S. 354 (1959); see also, RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 145, Re-
porter's note at 20; F. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Fourth), § 92. The "significant contact"
principles set forth in the Romero case were subsequently followed in McClure v. United States,
368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) and Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1966).
74358 U.S. at 382.
' Id. at 382. See also, Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 556, 557-58 (D. Del. 1962);
Noel v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D.N.J. 1958) for cases that involve plane crash-
es on the high seas and follow the reasoning in the Lauritzen and Romero cases.
7See Douglas, J., opinion in Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363 (1943). When fashion-
ing choice of law in federal courts, the court may follow state law.
"As to the desire for uniformity, see, Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Uniformity will not be accomplished until
admiralty fashions its own wrongful death remedy without regard to any state statute, see, cf.,
358 U.S. 588 (1959) (dissenting opinion), see also, 77 HARV. L. REV. 545, 546 (1963).
78 See, Justice Freedman's dissenting opinion in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse
Auto. A.B. Co., 372 F.2d 18, 21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
70 Supra, notes 57, 68, 73 and cases cited therein.
80For states that have abandoned the lex loci delicti theory, see, e.g., Watts v. Pioneer Corn
Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965) (construing Indiana law); Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rep.
31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Wartell v. Forinusa, 34 Ill.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Wessling
v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966);
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Engineering Co., 428 P.2d
898 (Ore. 1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Haumschild
v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wisc.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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jurisdiction as an action for negligent breach of contract of carriage, the
court side-stepped federal maritime law. If courts continue to characterize
such actions by looking to state law notwithstanding the maritime nature
of the action, state law could well supplant much of the non-statutory
federal maritime law. Furthermore, this procedure will create greater non-
uniformity and promote forum shopping. Of course, complete uniformity
will not be accomplished until admiralty fashions its own wrongful death
remedy without regard to any state statute."1 Although the court adjudi-
cated the wrongful death action on diversity jurisdiction and applied
Pennsylvania's choice of laws rule, the results would have been the
same had the court entertained the action on admiralty jurisdiction, since
maritime law has applied the significant contacts theory in admiralty
cases. 2 Even though the lex loci delicti theory is more uniform and pre-
dictable in theory than the significant contacts doctrine," the court recog-
nized that the rule is often unjust, and aptly stated that admiralty courts
should be free to apply the most equitable rule.
William A. Stewart
81 See note 77 supra and cases cited therein.
82 See notes 57, 68 and 73, supra and cases cited therein.
3 See, Stumberg, The Place of the Wrong-Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L.
REv. 388 (1959).
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CAB - Jurisdiction - Foreign Tour 'Operators
The appellants, Pan American World Airways, Inc. and Trans World
Airlines, Inc., filed suit in both the federal district and appellate courts
against the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The district court action was a
demand for a declaratory judgment and issuance of an order of mandamus
directing the members of the Board to exercise jurisdiction over unlicensed
German tour operators organizing inclusive tours1 to the United States
It was claimed that the Board's refusal to so act was beyond its statutory
power; this petition was denied. The court of appeals action was a
combination of an appeal from the district court decision and a review
of the Board's own decision.' The proceedings involved the approved appli-
cation by the CAB of a German airline, Sudflug Suddeutsche Fluggesell-
schaft (Sudflug),' for inclusive tour charter agreements with Scharnow,
Touropa, and other German tour operators; the approval permitted thirty
flights from Germany to the United States with the right reserved by the
Board to extend the flights beyond this number. Appellants argued that
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB exceeded its statutory
authority by refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the foreign air trans-
portation operations of German tour operators which were functioning as
indirect foreign air carriers within the meaning of the Act. Relying on a
previous decision of the court," appellants further argued that the court
had jurisdiction to review the questioned activities of the Board. Appellees
counter argued that the federal courts lacked "original jurisdiction"
because the particular issues raised were specifically excluded by statute,'
1 As understood by travelers, an "inclusive tour" includes expenses for travel, food, lodging, and
guided tours. As defined by the Board it is a "round trip tour which combines air transportation
pursuant to an inclusive tour charter and land services." 14 C.F.R. § 378.2(b) (1966).
It is well established that a district court action is appropriate to obtain an order of mandamus
and compel a federal agency to exercise its statutory jurisdiction when it otherwise refuses to do so.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States ex rel. Humbolt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1911).
3An appeal (No. 21,149) from the district court's dismissal (for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted) of a complaint for declaratory judg-
ment and mandamus challenging the Board's action was combined with the present cause of action
(No. 20,860) for direct review of the Board's non-exercise of jurisdiction.
'Airlines are of two basic types; scheduled air transportation or trunkline carriers, and non-
scheduled supplemental air carriers. Sudflug is of the latter classification, which, as the name im-
plies, augmentates the scheduled transportation by charter service. Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
101 (32), 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (32), (33) (1964).
Full name: Scharnow-Reisen GmbH., Kommanditgeselschaft.
' Full name: TOUROPA-DER" Deutsches Reiseburo GmbH.-Hamburg-Amerikanische Pack-
etfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft-Norddeutscher Lloyd-Amtliches Bayerisches Reiseburo GmbH.-
Reiseburo Dr. Carl Degener KG.7 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
8 Federal court "original jurisdiction" is strictly limited to that given by statute. Direct review
of the CAB is conferred on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or
any of the other United States courts of appeals by 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 74 Stat. 255, 75
Stat. 497, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964), which provides:
Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator under this
Chapter . . . shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals of the United
States or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upon
petition, filed within sixty days after the entry of such order, by any'person dis-
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and that the court of appeals decision referred to was not in point, for that
decision spoke of an exception to a judge-made rule, whereas the present
case dealt with a statutory rule.' Held, affirmed: The issue of jurisdiction
to review was side-stepped; the court upheld the Board's position of refus-
ing to exercise its jurisdiction over foreign tour operators. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 392 F.2d 483 (D. C.
Cir. 1968).
Section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act10 requires that a foreign air
carrier possess a permit issued by the Board before engaging in foreign
air transportation. As applied under this Act, a "foreign air carrier""
includes any person not a United States citizen who "whether directly
or indirectly or by lease or any other arrangement," engages in foreign
air transportation [Emphasis added.]. Such a permit shall be issued upon
a determination that the particular carrier is fit, willing, and able to
conform generally to the provisions of the Act, and that such transpor-
tation will be in the public interest." After filing of an application for a
permit, the Board shall give notice to the public that such an application
is sought, and set the date for a public hearing so that any interested
person may file a protest with the Board against the issuance of such
permit." In addition to the required CAB approval, any action taken by
the Board under Section 402 is also subject to approval by the President.1'
The Act also provides for review of any action taken by the Board or
its failure to act when it is required." The review is to be made by the
Board itself or an Administrator, if it falls under his jurisdiction. Beyond
this, any further review must be made by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia or the courts of appeals of the United
States;16 it must also be noted that an action may be brought in a United
States district court to prohibit the Board from exceeding its jurisdiction."
Appellants contention was that the tour operators by providing foreign
air transportation, by means of chartered aircraft as a part of their inclu-
sive tours, would be acting as "foreign air carriers" within the definition
of the Federal Aviation Act. 8 As such the Board had an absolute duty to
closing a substantial interest in such order. After the expiration of said sixty days
a petition may be filed only by leave of court upon a showing of reasonable grounds
for failure to file the petition theretofore.
'Id.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 402(a), 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (1964).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(19), 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (19) (1964).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 402(b), 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1964).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 402(d), 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(d) (1964).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 801, 72 Stat. 782, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
5 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 1002(a), 72 Stat. 788, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(a) (1964).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 1006(a), 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 74 Stat. 255, 75 Stat.
497, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964).
'Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958).
" Under the Act, a person need only be associated indirectly or by lease to be considered a
foreign air carrier; Scharnow, Touropa and the other German tour operators are considered foreign
air carriers, because by arranging for such tours, they have become by lease or indirect means at
least, as stated in Section 101 (19) of the Federal Aviation Act, required to obtain a permit as a
"foreign air carrier."
"Foreign air carrier" means any person, not a citizen of the United States, who
undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by lease or any other arrangement,
to engage in foreign air transportation. 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. S 1301 (19) (1964).
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exercise the jurisdiction given it under the Act.
Section 402 requires in no uncertain terms that no "foreign air
carrier" shall be permitted to engage in such air transportation activities,
unless it possesses a permit issued by the Board to such effect.' Here, since
no permit was issued the tour operators, the Board had violated the statute
as it had itself interpreted the statute in the International Airfreight
Forwarder Investigation.2 There is no specific case law regarding the CAB
and its authority to decline jurisdiction under Section 402 of the Federal
Aviation Act; however, appellants cited several cases dealing with similar
matters in other agencies of the federal government.' In these particular
decisions, there was a disregard of statutory procedure and requirements,
and in both cases the courts issued writs of mandamus to remedy the
agencies' failure to perform their statutory duty.
The Board, however, did not assert that the operators were unqualified
as "foreign air carriers;" its argument inter alia was that it was not
burdened by an absolute duty to act under these circumstances, and even
if there were such a duty, the appellants had not followed the necessary
statutory review methods set up, and the court of appeals lacked juris-
diction to determine questions concerning CAB jurisdiction of "foreign
air carriers,"" as did the district court. The Board justified the exercise of
this discretion based on the fact that the actual air transportation by
Sudflug, which had obtained a "foreign air carriers" permit from the
CAB, was at all times subject to regulation on an economic basis as well
as to the future imposition of conditions and possible revocation of its
permit for failure to contract tours which were in the "public interest."
The activities which most affected the tour operators took place outside
the boundaries of this country and any exercise of power by the Board
would be an attempt to extend its jurisdiction into a foreign country. The
Federal Aviation Act was not enacted for the purpose of regulating busi-
ness or citizens of foreign countries; to enforce such a theory would strain
any effective reciprocity and prejudice the ability of United States tour
operators to obtain the needed permission from foreign countries for their
own services.
"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 402(a), 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. 5 1372(a) (1964).
No foreign air carrier shall engage in foreign air transporattion unless there is in
force a permit issued by the Board authorizing such carrier so to engage.
"
5 CAB Order No. E-9179, 1955 (J.A. 115-117).
[The Board] does not possess the power to exempt or similarly relieve foreign
air carriers from any of the economic provisions of the Act as is the case with
United States air carriers . . . [and that it] may only authorize the conduct of
such operations by foreign citizens through the issuance of a permit, after hearing
and Presidential approval, as is provided in sections 402 and 801 of the Act.
This was explicitly understood by Board member Gillilland in his dissenting opinion from the
Board's present action.
The tour operators will be foreign air carriers engaged in foreign air transportation
without the permit required by section 402(c) of the Act. Neither tour operator
possesses such a permit and the Board does not propose to issue one. Instead it de-
clines to exercise jurisdiction. There is no statutory basis for such disclaimer.
' Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, No. 19,971 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Interstate Commerce
Commission v. United States ex rel. Humbolt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1911).
" "The court of appeals is not such a court of original jurisdiction unless specifically authorized
by statutory grant of power." A.F. of L. v. Labor Board, 308 U.S. 401, 404 (1940).
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Section 1006" is the only statutory basis for judicial review of the
Board's actions; it seems to fly directly in the face of any contention that
any court has the power to review CAB activities as related to "foreign
air carriers."" This point was summed up in British Overseas Airways
Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board,5 where the court stated:
Section 1006 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act . . . does not authorize review
by this court, now or later, of the proposed regulation in suit, since it is "[an]
order in respect of *** foreign air carrier[s] subject to the approval of the
President" under Section 801 . . . . This is not to say that there may not be
a judicial remedy against administrative, or even Presidential, action beyond
the scope of lawful authority, as defined by the Aviation Act. The petitions
will accordingly be dismissed, without prejudice to independent proceedings
in the District Court challenging the validity of the proposed regulation if
and when promulgated [Emphasis added.]. "
This decision would also seem to support appellant's contention that the
Act required the Board to act with regard to "foreign air carriers," and the
Board was subject to an action in the district court for exceeding its juris-
diction. However, this court found that the latter quoted portion of
British Overseas Airways Corporation, which stated that the Board's
actions might be reviewable in the district court, was questionable in light
of a Supreme Court decision, in which it was stated that unless the Consti-
tution was to the contrary, review of administrative action would turn on
whether or not Congress had chosen to give review. Thus, since the
Congress has given review to the courts of appeals of the United States
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, with the single
exception noted as to "foreign air carriers,"" it would seem that the old
common law adage of Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterhis was being
applied and that the district courts should be without jurisdiction to try
such an action because district court review was contrary to the review
scheme established by Congress.'
Despite this, there was authority based on a recent decision of the
present court" to the effect that under Section 1006 (a) appellate courts
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1006(a), 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 74 Star. 255, 75 Stat.
497, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964).
24Id. This section provides:
Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator under this
Chapter, except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the ap-
proval of the President as provided in section 1461 of this Title, shall be subject to
review by the courts of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upon petition, filed within sixty days after
the entry of such order, by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such
order. After the expiration of said sixty days a petition may be filed only by leave
of court upon a showing or reasonable grounds for failure to file the petition
theretofore [Emphasis added.].
aa 3 0 4 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"i1d. at 952-53.
27 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946).
28Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1006(a), 72 Stat. 795, as amended 74 Stat. 255, 75 Stat.
497, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964).
" The question of the right to judicial review is a problem with major ramifications which go
beyond the scope of this note. For a complete analysis of the subject see L. L. Jaffe, Judicial Con-
trol of Administrative Action (1965).
50American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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had jurisdiction to review the Board's actions where such were in excess
of its statutory authority.
The deference Waterman accords to Presidential discretion in matters of na-
tional defense and foreign policy as they bear on overseas air carriers has no
relevancy where, as here alleged, the President purports to approve a rec-
ommendation which the Board was powerless to make; if indeed the Board
has no power, then as a legal reality there was nothing before the President."'
Against this argument, the Board distinguished the present fact situation
from those dealt with in the cited decision. The tour operators involved
here are "foreign" air carriers involved in foreign air transportation and
those dealt with in American Airlines were "citizen" or United States
carriers involved in foreign air transportation. However, such a distinc-
tion seemed to be rebutted by the American Airlines decision, where the
court stated:
In Chicago and Southern Airlines Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948), the Supreme Court held that
orders granting or denying applications of citizen carriers to engage in over-
seas and foreign air transportation are exempt from Court of Appeals review
under Section 1006 of the Civil Aeronautics Act to the same extent as are
orders affecting foreign [air] carriers, since both types of orders are sub-
ject to Presidential approval [Emphasis added.]."
The opinion of this court stated that a thorough search of the statute did
not support the Board's position of discretion as to when the CAB was to
exercise its jurisdiction, but because of the diplomatic policy reasoning
given by the Board, the court had to support the logic of this position.
It is obvious that the jurisdictional problem involved in this area as to
which court, if any, had jurisdiction over questions of this nature is clearly
one which has not as yet been settled. This particular court did not follow
the standard procedure of the judiciary, to first determine its power to
decide a particular matter; it instead made the issue moot by affirming the
case without regard to such issue."
The validity of the court's position is questionable. It appeared that
the court, by not deciding the jurisdictional question, had taken this
"Id. at 353. The court also stated at 352:
The question immediately before us is whether the Waterman principle [Chicago
and Southern Airlines Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948),
in which the Supreme Court held that, by virtue of Section 1006(a) of the Federal
Aviation Act, the Courts have no power to review on the merits an order of the
Civil Aeronautics Board involving foreign air transportation which had been approved
by the President] governs a situation in which a petitioner claims that awards made
by the Board, with Presidential approval, exceed the Board's power under the act.
Stated in another way, does Waterman govern a situation where the action of the
Board, before the matter reaches the President, is beyond the Board's power to act?
We think not, for in the latter situation there is nothing legally to submit to the
President. Clearly Waterman presupposes lawfully exercised congressional authority
in the Board's action, in the first instance, as an indispensable predicate without
which there is nothing Presidential action can approve.
32 id. at 351-52.
" It is a well established principle that courts may avoid jurisdictional issues in appropriate
circumstances by a decision on the merits. Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1941); Ex
parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 448 (1929); Carrington v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 337 F.2d
913 (4th Cir. 1964).
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opportunity to give its support to the Board's position. If the court had
directly held that it did have jurisdiction," perhaps the circuit would have
been less willing to condone this agency's actions which appeared to be
beyond its administrative authority as set out by statute. The reasoning
behind the courts action is difficult to follow; the same results could
have been reached by simply dismissing the cause for lack of jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that current legislation is before Congress which is
directly related to this problem area; its passage could considerably clarify
the answers to the issues raised in this proceeding."5
Joseph W. Sheehan
' " It would seem that by deciding the issue without regard to the jurisdictional question the
court has presumed its power to decide the matter.
e5S. 3566, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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Government Liability -Type Certification -
Admiralty Jurisdiction
On 4 October 1960, an Electra turbo-prop aircraft' encountered a flock
of birds on take-off from Boston's Logan Airport. An ingestion of birds
caused engine failure, and the plane crashed into the waters of Boston
Harbor. Plaintiffs' sued the airline, the aircraft and engine manufacturers,
and the United States. In the action against the United States the plain-
tiffs alleged, inter alia, that the government was negligent in its type
certification of the Electra plane when it knew the aircraft was capable
of ingesting birds on take-off with a resulting loss of power. Held: The
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the federal govern-
ment in certification of the plane. The United States was liable under the
Suits in Admiralty Act.' Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
Government liability arising out of crashes of civilian aircraft is rela-
tively new to aviation law, and is far from being a well-developed field.
A major hurdle in any suit against the federal government is obtaining
the requisite consent to sue the sovereign.! Once consent is established
there still remains the complex problem of determining the standards to
be used in finding liability. Most actions against the government have
been under the Federal Tort Claims Act' (hereinafter FTCA) with the
air traffic control (hereinafter ATC) cases being most numerous. A strong
line of cases indicate that the federal government will be held liable under
the FTCA for the negligence of control tower operators. The leading case
in this area was the 1955 case of Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., in
which it was decided that the functions of control tower operators in
informing two planes of each other's activity and in issuing clearance to
land were operational in nature and, therefore, did not fall under the
"discretionary" exception7 of the FTCA. Since that decision, the number of
' A Lockheed Electra L-188, turbo-prop aircraft.
'A vast amount of other litigation has arisen from this one accident in which fifty-nine pas-
sengers and three crewmen were killed with ten persons surviving. For litigation other than that to
be discussed in this note, see: Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1963); Scott v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 17,979 (3d Cir. 1968); Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758
(3d Cir. 1963).
'The action was originally brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, but
judgment was rendered under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 425, 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
The significance of this is discussed later in this note.
' For a good overall survey of governmental liability for torts, see 3 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATTSE Chapt. 25 (1958).
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
6Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd me. sub
nom., United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1956).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) provides:
The provisions of this chapter and S 1346(b) for this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
actions against the government has increased greatly. In some cases it has
been determined that there was either no negligence on the part of the
government or that the negligence was not the proximate cause of the
accident.8 However, there has been a significant number of cases in which
negligence has been found.9 In Cattaro v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc.,"° the
court found the government had undertaken a duty to keep aircraft apart
"*whether it had to or not and in so doing became chargable with the negli-
gence of its employees. . . "" This was the equivalent of finding the
government liable under a "good samaritan" doctrine. 2 This approach was
taken in Inghain v. Eastern Air Lines" where the government was found
liable for the negligent reporting of weather conditions. It was pointed
out that the public relied heavily on the knowledge that the government
was constantly overseeing the carrier's operations in order to promote
safety. The court reasoned:
It is now well established that when the government undertakes to perform
services, which in the absence of specific legislation would not be required,
it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are performed negligently. 4
In Furumizo v. United States" the government was also held liable for
negligent acts of ATC personnel when a small plane was caught in the
wake turbulence of a larger one after receiving clearance coupled with a
cautionary warning from the control tower operator. The significant
aspect of Furumizo was that the government employees had followed the
prescribed procedure for the situation, but, as the district court noted:
There was simply a slavish purported following of the "book", with no
attempt to exercise judgment, which under the circumstances, it was the
duty and within the power of the controller to exercise, and which would
and could have avoided the accident [Emphasis added.]."
In a similar fact situation, a district court reached a contrary conclusion
in Hartz v. United States;" that court held that following of the Air
'See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844
(1965), no duty to warn small aircraft of helicopter on field where wake turbulence problems un-
known at time; United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956); De Vere v. True-Flite,
Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.C. 1967); McClenny v. United Air Lines, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 862
(W.D. Mo. 1959); Smerdon v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955); Georger v.
United States, 2 Av. Cas. 14,859 (D. Va. 1949).
'See, e.g., in addition to cases to be cited below: Maryland v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 768
(D.D.C. 1966); Hochrein v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Annot. 86
A.L.R.2d 384 (1962).
"°Cattaro v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va. 1964).
'lid. at 895.
" A good statement of this doctrine as it applies to the federal government is found in Fair v.
United States, 234 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1956) where it is stated: "if the government under-
takes to perform certain acts or functions thus engendering reliance thereon, it must perform them
with due care; that obligation of due care extends to the public and the individuals who compose
it .... "; Accord Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
"lngham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 88 U.S. 295 (1967).
For analysis of this case as decided by the district court see 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 185 (1967).
14id. at 236.
"Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), aff'd 381 F.2d 965 (9th
Cir. 1967).1o Id.
"Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965), rev'd, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1968).
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Traffic Control Procedures Manual by ATC personnel was a sufficient
exercise of care and no duty beyond that existed. This decision was re-
versed, 8 however, by the Court of Appeals, which held that a warning
given to the pilot was not in compliance with the Manual and was not
sufficient to caution the pilot.
A general survey of cases reveals that there has been an increasing
number of suits filed against the government and an apparent trend
toward findings of liability. Much of the concern of the courts to date has
been whether or not the particular situation before them fell within the
exceptions to liability under FTCA."
Rapp presents a provocative departure from the FTCA cases. What
was said in Rapp concerning consent to be sued and choice of forum is to
be found in the court's "Conclusions of Law" where it stated:
1) This Court has jurisdiction of the case against the government under the
Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C.A. 741-752. Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 3 Cir., 316 F. 2d 758 (1963).'0
This conclusion is interesting from two standpoints: First, the cited case
of Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 1 dealt only with Eastern's negli-
gence and explicitly stated that it was not concerned with any question
of government liability; and second, the Suits in Admiralty Act cited has
not previously been used to find government liability in aviation law.
Weinstein arose out of the same 1960 bird ingestion crash as Rapp. It
held that a tort action against the carrier for wrongful death arising from
the accident was cognizable in admiralty via a state wrongful death
statute, even though the negligent acts occurred on land.2 Thus, what the
Rapp court evidently meant when it cited Weinstein was that the action
against the government was cognizable in admiralty as a maritime tort.
Jurisdiction, however, must be based on more than a mere maritime
tort. The consent of the government to be sued must first be established. 3
Actions arising from aviation accidents have been brought in admiralty
against the United States under the Death on the High Seas Act,' but
have always been coupled with the foundation of the FTCA.' The Suits
in Admiralty Act approach to obtaining consent to sue the federal govern-
ment is without precedent in aviation law. The applicable provision of
the Suits in Admiralty Act is Section 742:
In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such
"Id.
'928 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
'°Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The court did in-
clude Section 742 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 425, 46 U.S.C. 5§ 741-52 (1964) in its
appendix to the decision. It should also be noted that the suit was originally brought under the
FTCA.
" Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940(1963).
2 For a more complete discussion of admiralty jurisdiction see Moore and Pelaez, Admiralty
Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AiR L. & CoM. 3 (1967).
"
3 For a discussion see: 1 A. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 187 (6th ed. 1940).
2441 Stat. 537-38, 46 U.S.C. §5 761-68 (1964).
2'See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962); Kunkel v. United States,
140 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property
were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate
nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States
or against any corporation mentioned in section 741 of this title [Emphasis
added to denote 1960 amendment.]."
Prior to the 1960 amendment it is clear that no action under the Suits
in Admiralty Act could be brought against the government unless the
complaint arose from operation of maritime vessels or dealt with maritime
cargo."7 The official title of Chapter 20 in the United States Code is "Suits
in Admiralty By or Against Vessels or Cargoes of the United States.""
The 1960 amendment, however, apparently opened a new door by adding
the phrase "or if a private person or property were involved."29 A few
non-aviation cases support this conclusion,' but there is also some authority
that the Act is still somewhat limited in scope.2 The House and Senate
reports" on the amendment indicate no real interest on the part of Con-
gress to expand the Act beyond its former bounds. The stated purpose of
the amendment was to prevent misfilings between admiralty and civil
courts. ' Thus, a literal reading of Section 742, as amended, indicates that
the court had jurisdiction and that consent to sue the federal sovereign
was contained therein, but the legislative history and a recent application of
the Act' do not clearly support this approach.
The differences between FTCA and admiralty jurisdiction are few, but
significant. In admiralty there may be no prohibition against punitive
damages, depending on local law, whereas under the FTCA' there is such
a prohibition. Certain defenses, as seen in the ATC cases, are available to
the government under the FTCA, the most common being the "discre-
tionary function" exception of Section 2680(a). Such exceptions to lia-
bility do not exist under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Finally it should
be noted that where an admiralty remedy is available under the Suits in
Admiralty Act, the FTCA is not available."8 The result of using the
admiralty procedure can be an assessment of liability easier to arrive at
2641 Stat. 425, 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
27 See, e.g., Angfortygsaktiebolaget Tirfing v. United States, 70 Ct. Cl. 251 (1930).
2"41 Stat. 425, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
29 It must be noted that there is a close similarity in the words used in the Suits in Admiralty
Act, § 742 and the words in the FTCA, § 2674.
35 See, e.g., Beeler v. United States, 338 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1964), considered on remand: 256
F. Supp. 771, 776 (W.D. Pa.1966): "It is clear that prior to the 1960 amendment to the Suits in
Admiralty Act, no proceeding such as this could have been maintained in admiralty against the
United States." Chelette v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Tex. 1964).
"In Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158 (1966), a claim was brought by government em-
ployees against the United States for wages, and it was held that the Suits in Admiralty Act was
not applicable.
a"S. REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); H. REP. No. 523, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), both to accompany H.R. 5396.
a3"Its purpose is to prevent the repetition of misfilings in the future. It restates in brief and
simple language the now existing exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the district courts, both on
their admiralty and law sides, over cases against the United States which could be sued on in ad-
miralty if private vessels, persons, or property were involved." H. REP,. No. 1894, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960).
" Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158 (1966).
"'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
2628 U.S.C. § 2680(d) states that any claim for which a remedy is provided under 41 Stat.
425, 46 U.S.C. 55 741-52 (1964), cannot be brought under the FTCA.
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and with different monetary awards than under the FTCA.
Beyond the consent-to-be-sued issue lies the more complex question of
the nature of the "duty" owed in various situations by the federal govern-
ment, and in particular, what constitutes actionable negligence in certi-
fication of aircraft.
In 1958, the Lockheed 188 Electra in Rapp was issued a "type" certifi-
cate ' which was necessary before the airplane could be used in air com-
merce. At the time of the particular Electra's certification the CAB was
"empowered" and had the "duty":
(a) To promote safety of flight in air commerce by prescribing and revising
from time to time-
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design, materials, work-
manship, construction, and performance of aircraft engines, and propellers
as may be required in the interest of safety; 8
The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics was authorized to issue type
certificates if he found:
That such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is of proper design,
material, specification, construction, and performance for safe operation and
meets the minimum standards, rules, and regulations prescribed by the
Board . a. .. "
On the basis of the above statutory provisions, the court found the gov-
ernment liable for issuing a type certificate for the 188 Electra when it
knew that the aircraft's engines were capable of bird ingestion which
would result in a loss of power.'
Government liability arising from the approval and certification of
aircraft is unprecedented in aviation law. Prior to Rapp, Gibbs v. United
States4' was the only reported case in which a plaintiff sought to recover
from the United States for the negligent certification of an airplane. In
Gibbs, the plaintiff brought an action against both the pilot and the United
States under the FTCA. The court found that the government was negli-
gent in approving, certifying, and licensing the plane, but that such negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of the accident and concluded that the
United States was not liable.' But Gibbs does not indicate whether the
"T Such a certificate is issued for a general type of aircraft. Also, each particular aircraft is certi-
fied and receives an airworthiness certificate. An aircraft must conform to a type certificate to
obtain an airworthiness certificate. 52 Stat. 1009, 1012, 49 U.S.C. §§ 553, 560 (1938), now Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, §5 603, 610; 72 Stat. 776, 780, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1430 (1964). In the
words of one noted authority: "It [certification] is the sine qua non, without which a manufacturer
may not sell and an operator may not use an airplane," Kreindler, Admiralty and Effect of Gov-
ernment Approval and Certification of Aircraft, 3 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 367, 370 (1961-62).
The court in Rapp, did not really distinguish between the two types of certification, but did speak
in terms of type certification.
's 52 Stat. 1007, 49 U.S.C. 5 551 (1938), now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 601, 72 Stat.
775, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1964).
39 52 Stat. 1009, 49 U.S.C. § 553 (1938), now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 610, 72 Stat.
780, 49 U.S.C. § 1423.
40 264 F. Supp. at 680. Prior to the certification of the plane, certain tests were conducted by
the government. In these tests four-pound chickens were injected into the engines. It was found
that the ingestion of such birds in the engine could cause a loss of power as well as internally dam-
age the engine, but nothing was done about the loss of power effect. Id. at 678.
4' Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
Id. The pilot's negligence was found to be the cause and he was held liable.
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government could have been liable even if it were negligent.
The position has been taken that if there is negligent inspection and
approval of aircraft proximately causing an accident, the United States
could be held liable.4 s In a 1961 article, Lee S. Kreindler stated:
If the responsibility of the government is predominant, then, presumably, in
litigation arising from these accidents, the government might be held just as
liable, or more liable, than the manufacturers. 4
In discussing liability, the Rapp court spoke in terms of "duty":
The C.A.B .... had the duty to promote safety of flight in commerce....
The Board had to exercise and perform its powers and duties in such a manner
as would tend to reduce or eliminate the possibility of accidents in air trans-
portation. 49 U.S.C. §551 [Emphasis added.]."
On this basis the court found that the conduct of the CAB4 1 could be
judged and liability assessed, but it made no real comment on how such
liability arose from the statutory provision which enumerated the duties
and powers of the CAB. Charging a governmental agency with a function
is not equivalent to rendering the government liable for defective per-
formance of that function, but establishing a basis for "duty" in govern-
mental negligence cases is often difficult and the courts have used varying
approaches.
In non-aviation cases, there is authority that an assumption of responsi-
bility by the federal government can give rise to a duty to exercise due
care in fulfilling that function. This seems to hold true whether or not
the activity in question could be assumed by private interests. In Indian
Towing Co. v. United States," the government tried to argue that the
maintenance of a lighthouse service was "uniquely governmental" and
therefore that an action under FTCA could not be maintained when the
Coast Guard was negligent in performing that function. The basis of
this argument was that Section 2674 of the FTCA used the words "shall
be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances." Mr. Justice Frankfurter rejected the "uniquely
governmental" approach urged by the government and found liability
under FTCA stating:
[O]nce it [Coast Guard] exercised its discretion to operate a light . . . and
engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated
to use due care to make certain the light was kept in good working order...
[Emphasis added.].
The Indian Towing decision presents a parallel to the situation involved in
Rapp. First, both activities-lighthouse maintenance and aircraft certifi-
4S L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, § 5.09 (Supp. 1966).
4 Supra note 37. It should be noted that this article deals mainly with liability of aircraft
manufacturers and carriers.
45 264 F. Supp. at 680.
46 At the time of the Electra's certification in Rapp the CAB did the certification. After 1958,
this became a function of the FAA.
41 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
48 Id. at 69. A strong dissent agreed with the government.
[Vol. 34
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
cation-were clearly governmental functions. Second, the statutory pro-
visions in both cases allowed recovery from the government where recov-
ery would be had from a private individual under the same facts."9 Indeed
the Indian Towing decision seems to support liability for negligent certifi-
cation of aircraft by finding of a "duty" arising from an assumed responsi-
bility.
The fact that a statutory provision indicates that a government agency
is to inspect and approve a particular item or project does not mean that
failure to do so will render the federal government liable for any injuries
that may follow. A good illustration of this is seen in the case of Mabler
v. United States" where it was held that the inspection provisions of a
statute dealing with federally-aided highways were not intended to create
a duty running to the plaintiff who was injured when his automobile
struck a boulder on a highway constructed with federal aid.
There has been virtually no litigation at the federal level dealing with
liabilities arising from duties imposed by statutory law. Attempts to draw
parallels between aircraft certification and other areas where government
inspection and approval51 are involved become most difficult because of
the almost complete lack of case law on the subject. In the few federal
cases which have been reported, the plaintiffs have not fared too well."
Furthermore, little is available concerning liabilities of state governments.
New York has produced the greatest number of cases, probably because of
its broad statutory waiver of sovereign immunity." In New York, failure
properly to inspect or adequately to warn after an inspection can give rise
to liability;54 however, there must be a statute prescribing a duty before
any liability can be found.5
The most cogent reason for supporting a finding of liability for negli-
gence by the government agency in certifying aircraft is that the public
relies heavily on aircraft being safe, and on the fact that the government
does inspect and control civil aviation to promote such safety. This type of
argument is at the heart of the Ingham, Cattaro and Furumizo ATC cases
and the Indian Towing decision. This is not finding liability for breach
49 Supra note 29.
"
5Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1963).
" Discussion here of responsibility of inspectors and certifiers other than government employees
has been omitted here because little is said in these cases that is not covered elsewhere in this note.
For background, see Bollin v. Elevator Construction & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949);
Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 168 A.2d 573 (S.C. Pa. 1961); Annot. 6 A.L.R.2d 284 (1949).
" United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1960); Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962); Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144
F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957).
5 Laws of New York, 1939, Ch. 860-§8 of the Court of Claims Act:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same
rules of the law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or
corporations ....
For general discussion of the New York system of claims against the state see McNamara, The
Court of Claims: Its Development and Present Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JOHNS I
(1965); Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for 'Purely Governmental Functions,' 10
SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958).
5 4 Metildi v. State of New York, 177 Misc. 179, 30 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 1941).
" Id.; Heiston v. State of New York, 189 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 1959).
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of a statutory duty, but rather because there was an undertaking, an
assumption of responsibility, which when pursued must be without negli-
gence. The government's function in licensing and certifying aircraft
fits well into such a category and in this area the responsibility is magni-
fied by public reliance.
If other instances arise where the government is held liable for certifi-
cation activities, Congress could enact legislation limiting or exempting
the United States from liability in this field. This would indeed clarify a
field where the finding of liability is questionable and perhaps unrea-
sonably expensive to the United States government.
Rapp presents a departure from prior aviation cases concerning govern-
ment liability and could influence litigation in other areas where certifi-
cation or inspection is involved. Further use of the Suits in Admiralty Act
could encourage future claims against the government and perhaps even a
Congressional reaction. It can also be conjectured that other courts may
be hesitant to extend government liability as far as did this decision. In
the meantime, the case stands as indicative of a recent trend toward gov-




Wrongful Death - Res Judicata - Multiplicity of Litigation
An action was brought in New York based upon wrongful death aris-
ing from the crash of an American Airlines airliner at Covington, Ken-
tucky, on 8 November 1965. Numerous proceedings against American
arose from this disaster; one especially pertinent to this action was Greasy
v. Anwrican Airlines, Inc.,' a Texas federal district court decision which
held for the plaintiff, applying the Kentucky wrongful death statute as
well as Kentucky's substantive law. A motion was made in the present
proceedings that summary judgment be granted in favor of the plaintiff
on the issue of liability. Plaintiff's contention was that by the prior Greasy
decision all triable issues of fact concerning the defendant's alleged negli-
gence had been adjudicated, and that by reason of res judicata this prior
determination of the issues should be accepted as a matter of law. Held,
motion denied: There is no authority to support plaintiff's contention that
a prior decision, concerning the same defendant, should be favorably
applied collaterally in a different forum, to a non-party, so as to render
res judicata the issue of liability decided in a foreign forum. Hart v.
American Airlines, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 17,894 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
To avoid a multiplicity of litigation, plaintiff contended that the judg-
ment on the liability issue given by the court in Creasy should have been
applied in this case, since the liability question was the same as that pre-
sented in this litigation. Defendant had ample opportunity to present his
arguments on this issue, with the aid of the same counsel in both cases.
Plaintiff's theory was not accepted; in federal diversity of citizenship
proceedings the question of estoppel is determined by the law of the state
where the federal district court is located.! Under Texas law, where Creasy
was decided, there is mutuality of estoppel; it is applicable only to those
parties who are directly or by privity related to the suit. The mere fact that
the plaintiff shares a common misfortune arising from the same circum-
stances as those in Greasy would not be enough to establish mutuality
under Texas law.3 Nor were there such contacts with the state of New
York as to give rise to a conflict between the law of Texas and that of New
York; the deceased as well as his surviving dependents were non-domi-
ciliaries of the state of New York. The full faith and credit provision of
the United States Constitution requires that the Texas judgment be
This case is currently on appeal, and thus far is unreported.
2New York v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Kloeb
v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199 (1940); Boulter v. Comm. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.2d 763 (9th
Cir. 1949).
'Kirby Lumber Corp. v. So. Lumber Co., 196 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1946); Groberry v.
Dallas, 250 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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accepted, and any attempt to modify this judgment by importing another
state's collateral estoppel law can not be accepted and will not render
res judicata the issue of liability.
On the facts of the present action, the court refused to accept plaintiff's
theory that Babcock v. Jackson' and De Witt v. Hall' are a basis upon
which collateral estoppel from another jurisdiction can be supported. The
claimed avoidance of multiple litigation on a particular issue is not by
itself enough to overrule the present New York authority,' nor does it
appear to be the final solution to a very complex problem.!
J.W.S.
Railway Labor Act - System Board of Adjustment
Review of Decision
Two flight attendants employed by Eastern Air Lines were discharged
because of alleged mishandling of the liquor service (under-reporting the
number of drinks sold and over-reporting the number of complimentary
drinks served) on a particular flight. The employees in question filed griev-
ances with the hearing officer under the procedure established by the
collective bargaining agreement then in force between their union and
Eastern. The hearing officer upheld the discharge and an appeal was had
to the applicable System Board of Adjustment, which also upheld the
discharge. Suit was then filed in federal district court. Plaintiffs sought
review of the System Board decision, reinstatement, back pay, and punitive
damages. The district court dismissed the action. On appeal, plaintiffs
claimed, inter alia, that they were denied constitutional and "industrial"
due process because (1) the hearing officer should not have conducted his
own investigation of the case, and (2) the System Board should not have
held a de novo hearing, but should have limited itself to a review of the
record made before the hearing officer. Held, dismissal afirmed: A decision
of a System Board of Adjustment is final and binding on the courts and
is not subject to review on the merits in the absence of a finding of a
denial of due process. Further, the remedy for mistreatment before a
hearing officer is in the hands of the System Board, and not in the courts,
even if the mistreatment constituted a denial of due process. Rosen v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968).
In setting forth the general rule of non-reviewability of System Board
awards, the Fifth Circuit quoted from a recent Supreme Court decision,
which stated:
This. Court time and again has emphasized and re-emphasized that Congress
intended minor grievances . . . to be decided finally by the . . . Adjustment
4 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
519 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967).
6 Id.
'Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513, 213 N.E.2d 796
(1965).
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Board.... Consequently, the merits ... as decided by the Adjustment Board
must be accepted by the District Court.!
However, the court recognized the authority of a district court to review
a System Board's award where some act of the Board has resulted in a
denial of fundamental or "industrial" due process. The test as to whether
the authority exists is whether the denial of due process constituted suffi-
cient grounds to allow a collateral attack on the jurisdiction of the System
Board. Here, the court found no such denial of due process which would
warrant review.
As to plaintiffs' claim of unfair treatment before the hearing officer,
the court held that federal courts are also without authority to review a
denial of due process which occurs prior to the action of the System
Boards. The remedy for such mistreatment is in the hands of the System
Board, and not in the federal courts.
D.L.B.
Federal Aviation Act - Security Interest Priorities -
Mechanics Liens
An aircraft, leased from one Smith, was taken by the lessee to Eastern
Airmotive Corp. (hereinafter Eastern) for repairs. Fourteen months later,
Eastern gave notice to Smith of its intention to sell the aircraft at a public
sale to satisfy its claims for repairs and storage. The basis for this action was
a claimed possessory aircraft mechanics lien which had arisen under New
Jersey statutory law. This lien, however, was not recorded by Eastern.
The bank which had financed the aircraft for Smith held a federally re-
corded security interest in the aircraft and intervened, challenging the
priority of Eastern's possessory mechanics lien. Held: A federally recorded
security interest in an aircraft has priority over an unrecorded aircraft
mechanics lien, which under state law would take priority over a perfected
security interest. Smith v. Eastern Airmotive Corp., 99 N.J. Super. 340,
240 A.2d 17 (1968).
Under New Jersey law, an aircraft mechanics lien is a possessory lien
which has express priority over a perfected security interest.' The federal
regulatory scheme, on the other hand, provides for central recording of
all interests in aircraft.! Eastern tried to avoid the impact of the federal
recording requirements by arguing that its interest in the aircraft did not
constitute a "conveyance" or "other instrument executed for security
' Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 259 (1965).
'New Jersey Stat. Annot., art. 2A:44-2, provides in part: "The lien shall be superior to all
other liens, except liens for taxes, and the operator of such aircraft shall be deemed the agent of
any owner, mortgagee, conditional vendor or other lienor thereof for the creation of such superior
lien." See also, New Jersey Stat. Annot., art. 12A:9-310.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 502, 72 Stat. 772, as amended, 73 Stat. 180, 78 Stat. 236,
49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
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purposes" as provided for in the Federal Aviation Act, which provides in
part:
The Administrator shall establish and maintain a system for the recording
of each of the following:
(I) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any civil
aircraft of the United States,
(2) Any ...other instrument executed for security purposes .
The court, however, rejected this approach and found that Eastern's
interest fell within the federal law and, since the interest had not been
recorded as it could have been, the perfected security interest would prevail.
As the court pointed out, all reported federal and state cases that have
considered the question have held that the federal system gives validly
recorded security interests priority over unrecorded mechanics liens, even
where under the state law a different result would obtain. The directive of
Smith and other cases dealing with similar security interest questions
involving aircraft' is clear-federal recordation is an absolute requisite.
N.D.K.
3 Id.
4See, e.g., In re Veteran's Air Express Co., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948); American
Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation Insurance Managers, Inc., 244 Ark. 829, 427 S.W.2d 544 (1968); Con-
tinental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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